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Abstract
Capital punishment has generated an incredible amount of public debate. Is the practice constitutional?
Does it deter crime? Is it humane? Supporters and opponents of capital punishment disagree on all of
these issues and many more. There is perhaps only one thing that unites these two camps: the belief that
the death penalty is society's most severe punishment. In this Article, I argue that this belief is mistaken.
Capital punishment is not at the top of the punishment hierarchy. In fact, it is no punishment at all. My
argument builds from a basic conception of punishment endorsed by the Supreme Court: for something
to qualify as a punishment, it must be bad, in some way, for the person who is punished. By drawing upon
the philosophical literature regarding death, I show that this is not the case. Contrary to our intuitions, the
death penalty is not bad, in any way, for a condemned criminal. This conclusion should not be understood
to suggest that death is never bad. In most circumstances, death is bad. There are, however, situations in
which it is not, and capital punishment, as employed in the United States penal system, is one such
situation. By showing that capital punishment is not bad for the condemned criminal, I provide a strong
constitutional objection to the practice.
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WHY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS NO
PUNISHMENT AT ALL
JASON IULIANO*

Capitalpunishment has generated an incredible amount of public debate.
Is the practice constitutional? Does it deter crime? Is it humane? Supporters
and opponents of capitalpunishment disagree on all of these issues and many
more. There is perhaps only one thing that unites these two camps: the belief
that the death penalty is society's most severe punishment.
In this Article, I argue that this belief is mistaken. Capitalpunishment is not
at the top of the punishment hierarchy. In fact, it is no punishment at all. My
argument buildsfrom a basic conception ofpunishment endorsed by the Supreme
Court: for something to qualify as a punishment, it must be bad, in some way,
for the person who is punished. By drawing upon the philosophical literature
regardingdeath, I show that this is not the case. Contrary to our intuitions, the
death penalty is not bad, in any way, for a condemned criminal.
This conclusion should not be understood to suggest that death is never bad. In
most circumstances, death is bad. There are, however, situationsin which it is not,
and capitalpunishment, as employed in the United States penal system, is one such
situation. By showing that capital punishment is not bad for the condemned
criminal,I provide a strong constitutionalobjection to the practice.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

In troduction ......................................................................................
I. Legal Justifications for the Death Penalty .............................
A . D eterrence ..........................................................................
B . Retribu tion .........................................................................
II. Capital Punishment is Not a Punishment .............................
A. Capital Punishment is Not Intrinsically Bad .....................
*

1377
1379
1382
1394
1403
1406

Ph.D. candidate in Politics, Princeton UniversitfJ.D., HarvardLaw School Thanks

to Madison Kilbride and Sarah McGrath for their valuable comments on this Article.

1377

1378

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1377

B. Capital Punishment is Not Instrumentally Bad ................
1. The perception problem ...........................................
2. The tim ing puzzle ......................................................
3. The symm etry argum ent ............................................
C. Capital Punishment is Not Comparatively Bad ................
1. Life without parole means life without parole .........
2. Why life without parole is worse than death .............
C on clusion ........................................................................................

1411
1412
1418
1423
1428
1431
1434
144 1

INTRODUCTION

The death penalty is the worst punishment society can inflict upon
one of its members. It is the most powerful act of reprobation-the
ultimate sign of condemnation for a fellow human. Politicians have
declared it.' Scholars have affirmed it.2 Even the United States
Supreme Court has held it to be true.'
The claim that death is the ultimate sanction has been repeated so
frequently that most simply accept it without question.4 In this
Article, however, I ask whether such acceptance is warranted. My
investigation leads me to conclude that it is not. In the U.S. criminal
justice system, capital punishment is not actually a punishment. As
unintuitive as this claim sounds, the Supreme Court's theory of
punishment supports this conclusion.
The particular theory endorsed by the Court is known as
retribution, and one of its core principles is that, for something to be
a punishment, it must be bad, in some way, for the one who is

1. See, e.g., George Ryan, Governor of Ill., Speech at Northwestern University
College of Law (Jan. 11, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/11/national/
I ICND-RTEX.html (calling capital punishment "the most severe sanction").
2. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
ConstitutionalSentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1201
(2009) (calling the death penalty "the most severe punishment"); Stephen B. Bright,
Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALE L.J. 1835, 1837 (1994) (declaring the death penalty "society's ultimate
punishment"); Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1662, 1662 (1986) (referring to the death penalty as "our harshest punishment").
3. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) ("The death penalty is
the gravest sentence our society may impose."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568
(2005) (noting that "the death penalty is the most severe punishment" (citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(plurality opinion))); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (explaining that society views death as "the ultimate sanction").
4. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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punished.' I argue that the death penalty does not actually meet this
criterion. As practiced in the United States, the death penalty is not
bad, in any way, for the executed individual.'
My argument obviously raises the question of what it means for
something to be bad. In answering this, I endorse a widely accepted
philosophical theory of harm. Specifically, this theory holds that
there are three types of harms: (1) intrinsic harms, (2) instrumental
harms, and (3) comparative harms. In this Article, I examine each
category and explain why the death penalty does not qualify for any
of them. My arguments are firmly grounded in the philosophical
debate surrounding the badness of death.7
The overwhelming majority of philosophers engaged in this debate
believe that, in some circumstances, death is not bad. In this Article,
I argue that the death penalty is one of these circumstances. If I am
correct that the death penalty is not a punishment within the
Supreme Court's theory of retribution, then the practice has no place
in our criminal justice system, and its continued use is
constitutionally problematic. Specifically, it is a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the Supreme Court's two legal
justifications for the death penalty--deterrence and retribution. I
begin by reviewing the empirical literature on the deterrent effects of
the death penalty and showing that this rationale lacks sufficient
support to provide a constitutional basis for the punishment. Next, I
examine the Court's theory of retribution. In Part II, I investigate
whether that theory can provide a constitutional justification for the
death penalty. Ultimately, I conclude that it cannot. Because the
death penalty is not bad for the executed individual, it is not a
punishment within the Court' s understanding of the term.
I. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

Between 1775 and 1974, more than thirteen thousand people were
put to death in the United States.8 During this period, the Supreme
5. See infra Part I.B. There are additional generally accepted criteria of a lawful
punishment For instance, only a legitimate authority can impose punishments, and the
way in which a punishment is bad must be a desired effect of the legitimate authority's
sanction. These other criteria, however, are not relevant to the discussion at hand.
6. It is important to emphasize that this is distinct from the claim that death is
never bad for the person who dies.
See infra Part I.B.
7.
8.
US Executionsfrom 1608-2002: A Demographic Breakdown of the Executed Population,
PROCON.ORG, http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=004087.
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Court consistently affirmed the constitutionality of the death
penalty.9 At various points, the Justices did suggest that some forms
of execution, such as quartering, might be unconstitutional;"'
however, they never found a problem with capital punishment as
actually practiced by the states. Indeed, in 1971, the Supreme Court
went so far as to hold that states need not establish standards to
govern the jury's imposition of the death penalty in capital cases."
Then, in the 1972 case Furman v. Georgia,'2 the Supreme Court
reversed course, holding that the death penalty, as then applied,
violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.13 Furman uniquely divided the Court, yielding nine
separate opinions. On top of that, not a single Justice who adopted
the majority conclusion joined the opinion of any other Justice. This
resulted in five separate concurrences and failed to produce a
plurality-much less a majority-opinion.
Despite the inability of the Justices to coalesce behind a single
opinion, common rationales ran through the concurrences.
Specifically, all five of the Justices who sided with the majority
conclusion expressed concerns over the arbitrary and capricious
manner in which the death penalty was being imposed." Whereas
Justices Brennan and Marshall would have held that the death
penalty was irredeemably unconstitutional, Justices Douglas, Stewart,
and White concluded only that the death penalty was unconstitutional as
currently practiced. 5 Although these three Justices indicated that no

9. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890) (holding that execution by
electric chair is constitutional because it causes an "instantaneous, and therefore painless,
death"). The Court further clarified that "the punishment of death is not cruel[] within
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.
[Cruel] implies there [is]
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." Id. at 447; see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878) (holding that
execution by firing squad was not cruel and unusual punishment).
10. Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301 (1872).
11.
McGauthav. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
13. Id. at 239-40. Furman had the immediate effect of commuting the death
sentences of all 558 people on death row. See James W. Marquart & Jonathan R.
Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to
Society from Capital Offenders, 23 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 5, 14 (1989).
The Eighth
Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines

imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Justice Potter Stewart gave what was perhaps the most colorful analysis,
comparing the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty to being struck by lightning.
SeeFurman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart,J., concurring).
15. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)
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existing regimes were constitutional, they left open the possibility that
the death penalty could be constitutionally implemented. "
Over the next few years, state legislators passed statutes that they
hoped would alleviate the Court's concerns regarding arbitrary
sentencing practices. 7 Criminals sentenced to death under these
new guidelines filed appeals challenging the constitutionality of their
sentences. 18 Five of these cases-challenges against statutes in
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas-were
consolidated and formed the basis for the landmark 1976 Supreme
Court decision, Gregg v. Georgia.9 In that case, the litigants urged the
Court to go beyond Furman and definitively hold that the death
penalty is per se unconstitutional."0
The Justices declined to take that path. Instead, Justice Stewart,
writing for the Gregg plurality, held that capital punishment was not,
in itself, cruel and unusual.2' Capital punishment failed to meet this
threshold because it (1) was compatible with "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"22 and (2)
"accord[ed] with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept
23

underlying the Eighth Amendment.'
As evidence for the claim that society still supported the death

penalty, the plurality noted the extensive legislative reaction to
Furman.2 4 The Justices found it particularly compelling that, in the
four years following Furman, the U.S. Congress and thirty-five states
25
enacted new laws allowing for the death penalty.

Turning to the human dignity prong, the Court wrote that in order
to satisfy this condition, the death penalty "cannot be so totally
without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous
infliction of suffering." 26 In other words, society's view of the death
penalty as a valid form of punishment, by itself, is insufficient to
justify its use; the death penalty must also further the goals of the
(discussing the Justices' opinions inFurman).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 179-80.
18. See, e.g., id. at 162.
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168, 177, 183-84, 201 n.52 (1976)
(plurality opinion).
20. Id. at 168
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v.Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
23. Id.; see also id. at 179-80, 182, 184, 187.
24. Id. at 179-80 & n.23.
25. Id. at 179-80.

26.

Id. at 183.
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criminal justice system. The Court specifically
acknowledged two
2 7
.
retribution
and
deterrence
goals:
such
A.

Deterrence

According to deterrence theory, punishment is justified by its
ability to discourage people from committing crimes. 28 There are two
main types of deterrence. The first-known as specific deterrenceworks by punishing a criminal to dissuade him from committing a
crime in the future. 2'
The theory posits that people who are
punished for their illegal actions will be less likely to commit
additional crimes. For instance, a drunk driver who is arrested and has
his license temporarily revoked will be less inclined to drink and drive
again. The memory of these negative experiences will act as a strong
deterrent against future transgressions. For obvious reasons, the death
penalty is a surefire method of specific deterrence. After all, criminals
who are executed are incapable of committing any additional crimes.
Specific deterrence, however, is not normally what people are
referring to when they speak of the death penalty's deterrent effects.
Instead, they mean general deterrence. Whereas specific deterrence
works on the actual criminal, general deterrence focuses on would-be
criminals.3" This form of deterrence works by discouraging people
who observe how others are punished from committing their own
crimes."
For example, a person who knows that murderers are
severely punished will be less likely to kill someone than a person who
is not aware that murderers are severely punished.
27. Id. Some lower courts have claimed that the incapacitation of dangerous
criminals is another possible justification for capital punishment.
See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 685-86 (Mass. 1975); People v.
Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 896 (Cal. 1972).
However, I will not explore this
justification for two reasons: (1) because the Supreme Court has not endorsed this
rationale, and (2) because it is generally accepted that life without parole serves the
ends of incapacitation just as well.
28.

For the classic discussions of deterrence, see CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES

AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 19-21, 31, 66-70 (Richard Davies et al. trans.,
1995) and JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 140-57 (Batoche Books 2000) (1781). See Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169, 183-84 (1968) (evaluating
punishment through an economic lens); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1195 (1985) (presenting a modern version of
deterrence based on economic theory).
29. Deterrence Theory, I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
233-34 (Mary Bosworth ed., 2005) [hereinafter Deterrence Theory].
30. Id. at 233.
31. Id.
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When the Supreme Court asserted that deterrence was a legitimate
basis on which to defend capital punishment, it was primarily
concerned with general deterrence:" Indeed, the Justices examined
the existing literature in an effort to determine whether the death
penalty has any general deterrent effects and ultimately found that
Basing their evaluation of the
the literature was "inconclusive.""
empirical evidence on a since widely discredited study by Isaac
Ehrlich, 4 the Court wrote that "there is no convincing empirical
evidence either supporting or refuting" the view that the death
penalty functions as a "greater deterrent than lesser penalties.""
Since the Court's decision in Gregg, many scholars have analyzed
the deterrent effect of the death penalty, and the overwhelming
majority of them have concluded that capital punishment does not

32. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-86.
33. Id. at 184-85.
34. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life
and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397-98 (1975). The National Academy of Sciences set
up a panel chaired by Nobel Laureate Lawrence R. Klein to look into Ehrlich's
conclusions. After careful review, the panel found that the study was seriously
flawed. See Lawrence R. Klein et al., The Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment: An
Assessment of the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 336, 358-59 (Alfred Blumstein et al.

eds., 1978). There are many additional criticisms of Ehrlich's study. See, e.g.,, David
C. Baldus & James W. L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac
Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170, 173-83 (1975)
(finding flaws in Ehrlich's study with respect to model construction and research
design); William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, TheIllusion ofDeterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's
Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187, 187-99 (1975) (discussing
inadequacies in Ehrlich's data and errors in his regression analysis); Stephen A.
Hoenack & William C. Weiler, A Structural Model of Murder Behavior and the Criminal
Justice System, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 327, 327-37 (1980); Richard M. McGahey, Dr.
Ehrlich's Magic Bullet: Economic Theory, Econometrics, and the Death Penalty, 26 CRIME AND
DELINQ. 485, 485-502 (1980); Peter Passcll & John P. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 445, 445 (1977) (criticizing
Ehrlich's models for being "extremely sensitive to the choices of included
explanatory variables and the functional form of the model" and concluding that
Ehrlich's study "permit[s] no inference about the deterrent effect of capital
punishment on homicide"); Jon K. Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359, 360-65 (1976). For Ehrlich's defense against
these attacks, see generally Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE
L.J. 209 (1975); Isaac Ehrlich, On Positive Methodology, Ethics, and Polemics in Deterrence
Research, 22 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 124 (1982); Isaac Ehrlich, Rejoinder, 85 YALE L.J. 368

(1976). Finally, for a response to Ehrlich's rebuttals, see generally Deryck Beyleveld,
Ehrlich's Analysis of Deterrence: MethodologicalStrategy and Ethics in Isaac Ehrlich's Research
and Writing on the Death Penalty as a Deterrent, 22 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1982).
35. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185.
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deter crime. 6 Only a small number of economists have found a
correlation between the number of executions and the homicide
rate.37 However, these studies have been fiercely criticized and fail to
reflect the consensus that has emerged in the academic community. 8
36. See, e.g., Dieter D611ing et al., Is DeterrenceEffective?: Results of a Meta-Analysis of
Punishment, 15 EUR. J. CPIM. POL'Y & RES. 201, 219-21 (2009) (conducting a metaanalysis of fifty-two death penalty studies and concluding that "[t]he legal threat of
the death penalty appears to have no influence whatsoever on the level of crime");
Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. &
ECON. REv. 318, 321-22 (2003) (concluding that "[t]here simply does not appear to
be enough information in the data on capital punishment to reliably estimate a
deterrent effect"); Tomislav V. Kovandzic et al., Does the Death Penalty Save Lives?: New
Evidence from State Panel Data, 1977 to 2006, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 803, 803
(2009) (employing state panel data over a thirty-year period and finding "no
empirical support for the argument that the existence or application of the death
penalty deters prospective offenders from committing homicide"); Franklin E.
Zimring et al., Executions, Deterrence, and Homicide: A Tale of Two Cities, 7J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (2010) (finding that "[h]omicide levels and trends are remarkably
similar" in Hong Kong and Singapore despite the fact that Hong Kong has abolished
the death penalty and Singapore probably had one of the highest rates of executions
in the world). Most commentators who have reviewed the literature also place more
faith in the studies questioning the deterrent effect of capital punishment. See, e.g.,
William J. Bowers, The Effect of Executions is Brutalization, Not Deterrence, in
CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 49, 71
(Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988); Mark Constanzo & Sally
Constanzo, The Death Penalty: Public Opinions, Legal Decisions, andJurorPerspectives, in
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 246, 248-49 (Mark Constanzo & Stuart Oskamp eds., 1994);
Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting
Personal,83 CORNELLL.REv. 1448, 1448-50 (1998).
37. See Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does CapitalPunishment Have a DeterrentEffect?
New Evidence from PostmoratoriumPanel Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 344, 369 (2003)
(finding "that each additional execution has resulted, on average, in eighteen fewer
murders"); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted
Sentences and the DeterrentEffect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 474 (2003)
(concluding that "[e]ach additional execution decreases homicides by about five,
and each additional commutation increases homicides by the same amount, while
one additional removal from death row generates one additional homicide");Joanna
M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capital
Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 308 (2004) (concluding that "each execution
resulted in approximately three fewer murders" and "each death penalty sentence
resulted in approximately 4.5 fewer murders"); Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions,
Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder, 7J. APPLIED ECON. 163, 166 (2004) (estimating
"that each state execution deters approximately fourteen murders per year on
average"); Roy D. Adler & Michael Summers, Capital Punishment Works, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 2, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI19397079767680173
(claiming that, between 1979 and 2004, "each execution carried out [was] correlated
with about 74 fewer murders the following year").
38. See, e.g., Deterrence Themy, supra note 29, at 236 ("Collectively, the empirical results of
the death penalty studies have concluded that the death penalty does not deter murder.").
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In particular, these pro-deterrence studies have been attacked on the
grounds that they omit key variables, that they use certain
econometric techniques incorrectly, and that minor changes in their
regression models produce wildly different findings."
In a piece published in the Stanford Law Review, John Donohue and
Justin Wolfers evaluated a study that claimed each execution prevents,
on average, eighteen murders and that the margin of error was plus or
minus ten (i.e. a ninety-five percent confidence interval between twentyeight and eight murders).4" Using the exact same dataset, but with
standard adjustments to the regression specifications, Donohue and
Wolfers estimated the margin of error to be slightly more than one
hundred. This means that, with a very minor tweak, tie ninety-five
percent confidence interval balloons to a range of 119 lives saved per
execution and eighty-two additional lives lost.'1 Although the actual
truth almost certainly lies within this interval, this is hardly a finding that
should convince legislators to support capital punishment.42
Other prominent studies purporting to find a deterrent effect have
similar flaws. One such case is the 2003 article by H. Naci Mocan and
R. Kaj Gittings that examined 6,143 death sentences between 1977
and 1997. 43 Their analyses showed that each additional execution
decreases the number of homicides by five and that each additional
commutation increases the number of homicides by five. 4
Two other scholars who subsequently reviewed Mocan and Gittings's
data found that, after making minor changes to the variables in the
regression model, all the deterrent effects disappear.45 For instance, the
simple act of removing Texas from the dataset completely eliminates any
observable deterrent effect of the death penalty.4"
39. SeeJohn J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of EmpiricalEvidence in
the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 842 (2005) (arguing that studies
showing a deterrent effect "either fail to account for developments in unaffected
states, apply sophisticated methods in an entirely inappropriate manner, or yield
results which are clearly not robust to small changes"); see also Richard Berk, New
Claims About Executions and GeneralDeterrence: Deja Vu All Over Again?, 2J. EMPIRIcAL
LEGAL STuD. 303, 320-24 (2005); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and DeterrenceRedux: Science, Law
and CausalReasoningon CapitalPunishment,4 OHIo ST.J. CRIM. L. 255, 309-10 (2006).
40. See Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 39, at 813-16 (reviewing Dezhbakhsh
et al., supra note 37).
41. See id. at 834-35.
42. See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, The Death Penalty: No Evidence for
Deterrence,3 ECONOMISTS' VOICE 1, 3 (2006).
43. See Mocan & Gittings, supra note 37, at 460.
44. See id. at 456.
45. See Berk, supranote 39, at 320-24; Fagan, supra note 39, at 310.
46. See Berk, supra note 39, at 321, 323 (arguing that Mocan and Gittings's
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The deterrent effect also disappears when more accurate execution
figures are used in the dataset. In their study, Mocan and Gittings
compiled a statistic they called "risk of execution."4 7 This variable is
the number of executions divided by the number of death sentences
six years earlier."
Because of the impossibility of dividing by zero,
Mocan and Gittings coded years with no death sentences as 0.99." If,
however, the authors had used a figure that more closely approximates
50
zero (such as 0.01), they would not have found any deterrent effects.
Other minor changes, such as dividing by the number of death
sentences two years prior rather than six years prior, also eliminate
statistical significance.5 ' Ultimately, the fact that these small alterations
have such large effects on the estimated deterrent effects suggests that
52
we should be wary of relying upon Mocan and Gittings's conclusions.
Although these pieces have their methodological shortcomings,
some studies go well beyond that and exhibit a profound lack of
sophistication. One study discussed favorably by several news outlets
concluded that every execution saves seventy-four lives.5 However,
the researchers who advanced this claim failed to control for any
variables.54 Instead, they merely charted the number of executions
and the number of murders per year between 1979 and 2004 and
observed that, in years with more executions there were fewer

"'findings' are clearly an artifact of the Texas observations").
47. Mocan & Gittings, supra note 37, at 459.
48. Id.
49. See Fagan, supra note 39, at 309.
50. See id. (noting that once this substitution is made "deterrence is no longer
statistically significant").
51. See id. at 310 (explaining why lagging the variable by two years makes more
sense than lagging it by six years).
52. See id. ("The sensitivity of these analyses to alternate specifications
undermines the claims by MG of robust deterrence findings.").
53. See Adler & Summers, supra note 37; Michael Smerconish, Death Penalty Deters,
HUFF1NGTON Posr (May 25, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michaelsmerconish/death-penalty-deters-b_72075.html (calling Adler and Summers's findings
a "stunning statistic" that should, but does not, sway death-penalty opponents); Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Opening Argument- The Death Penalty: Slowly Fading?, NAT'LJ. (Nov. 17,
2007), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/opening-argument-the-death-penaltyslowly-fading-20071117.
54. Farai Chideya, Does Death Penalty Deter Crime?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 20,
2007, 9:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=16468497
(interviewing Cass Sunstein, who described Adler and Summers's findings as "way
out of line compared to [I other studies" and noted that their study does not
"control for confounding variables").
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murders and vice versa.55 Given the crudeness of this model, it is easy
to understand why other scholars have not found the study credible. 6
Once the flaws in the pro-deterrence studies are understood, it
becomes much harder to accept their conclusions. Thus, we are left
with two possibilities. One option is to reserve judgment and maintain
that, at least as of yet, there is little or no evidence that the death
penalty has a deterrent effect.57 The other option is to conclude that
the death penalty has no deterrent effect. Most criminologists who
have considered the matter have adopted this latter position.
A 2008 survey found that eighty-eight percent of leading
criminologists believe that, according to the best empirical evidence
available, the death penalty does not deter crime. 8 Only 9.2 percent
of the survey's respondents think that the death penalty significantly
reduces the number of homicides.59 Further, seventy-five percent of
criminologists believe that the death penalty debate is a distraction that
prevents the government from enacting real solutions to fight crime. 6"
Despite the overwhelming evidence and general consensus among
scholars that the death penalty does not lower the murder rate, most
Americans still support capital punishment. In a 2014 Gallup poll,
sixty-three percent of adults favored the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder, and only thirty-three percent opposed it.6 This
55. See Adler & Summers, supra note 37 ("There seems to be an obvious negative
correlation [between the number of executions and murders] in that when executions
increase, murders decrease, and when executions decrease, murders increase.").
See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide
56.
Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 498
(2009) (calling the Adler and Summers study "astonishingly simple"); Chideya, supra
note 54 (quoting Cass Sunstein as saying the study is "entitled to very little weight").
57. Even this milder conclusion provides a strong basis on which to reject the
death penalty's deterrent value. See Robert A. Pugsley, A Retributivist Argument Against
CapitalPunishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1501, 1509 (1981) (arguing that the burden of
proof should be on those who defend capital punishment and that "[o]nly a moral theory
which places no or negligible value on individual human life" would permit otherwise).
58. See id.; see also Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the DeathPenalty:
The Views of theExperts, 87J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 (1996) (finding that 83.6 percent of
criminologists believe that the death penalty does not lower the homicide rate).
59. Radelet & Lacock, supra note 56, at 502; see also Radelet & Akers, supra note
58, at 7 (finding that 86.5 percent of criminologists agree with the statement
"abolishing the death penalty [in a particular state] would not have any significant
effects on the murder rate [in that state]"). Additionally, "fewer than [ten percent]
of the polled experts believe the deterrence effect of the death penalty is stronger
than that of long-term imprisonment." Radelet & Lacock, supra note 56, at 503.
60. See Radelet & Lacock, supra note 56, at 502.
61. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans' Support for Death Penalty Stable, GALLUP (Oct. 23,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178790/ameicans-support-death-penalty-stable.aspx.
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result is not an outlier."2 In fact, surveys have consistently shown that,
for nearly all of the past one hundred years, a majority of Americans
have supported the death penalty.6 3 More interestingly, people claim
to hold this view precisely because they believe it prevents murders.64
Why is this the case? Why, despite all the evidence to the contrary,
5
do citizens continue to believe that the death penalty deters crime?
The answer is simple-confirmation bias. This psychological failure
is the human tendency to seek out or interpret information in such a
way that it confirms one's existing beliefs.66 Confirmation bias
explains the evaluative process that Americans engage in when they
examine whether capital punishment has a deterrent effect.
Americans arrive at the death penalty debate already possessing
entrenched sentiments for or against the practice. When presented with
a new study, the average person does not evaluate it from an unbiased
perspective.67 Instead, he compares its conclusions with his current
beliefs.'a If the study supports his preferred position, he accords the
62. See, e.g., Peter Moore, Poll Results: The Death Penalty,YouGov (May 5, 2014, 11:38
AM), https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/05/05/poll-results-death (finding that [sixtyfive percent] of Americans support the death penalty); ShrinkingMajority ofAmericans Support
DeathPenalty, PEw REs. 0R. (Mar. 28,2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/28/
shrinking-majority-of-americans-support-death-penalty (finding that fifty-five percent
of Americans support the death penalty for persons convicted of murder and only
thirty-seven percent were opposed).
63.
See Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/deathpenalty.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2015) (providing annual death penalty survey
results from 1936 to 2014).
64. See, e.g., Tom Kuntz, Killings, Legal and Othenise, Around the U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1994, at E3 ("[Fifty-seven] percent of [New York State registered voters polled]
said they thought the death penalty would deter other criminals from killing.").
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon
in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) ("Confirmation bias, as the term
is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes the seeking or interpreting
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in
hand.").
For an in-depth discussion of the various operational definitions of
confirmation bias, see Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, 32 PSYCHOL.
LEARNING & MOTIVATION 385, 385-87 (1995).
67. See Charles W. Thomas, Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Death Penalty: The
Relevance of Informed Public Opinion, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1005, 1029 (1977) ("The lack of
an actual deterrent effect [in the research] leads to the conclusion that much of the
support for the death penalty is not based upon a reasonable, informed assessment
of the best available contemporary evidence. The strong support appears instead to
be the consequence of an uninformed and far too generous assessment of the
deterrent effect of the death penalty.").
68. See Klayman, supra note 66, at 386-87 (explaining that hypothesis
development involves interpreting new data based on an initial belief).
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study significant weight; however, if the study reaches a disfavored
conclusion, he quickly dismisses it." This process is the most succinct
way to explain the disconnect between the persistent academic
conclusion that the death penalty fails to reduce crime and the
American public's conclusion that the death penalty acts as a powerful
deterrent. This explanation also has strong empirical support.
In a classic psychology experiment, researchers demonstrated how
confirmation bias affects people's ability to analyze death penalty
studies in a neutral manner. 0 For the experiment, the authors
recruited a group of forty-eight Stanford undergraduates, half of
whom supported the death penalty and half of whom opposed it."1
Each subject was presented with two fictitious death penalty studiesone showing a strong deterrent effect and another showing no
deterrent effect-and asked to evaluate the research designs.72 As the
researchers predicted, the participants perceived the study that
supported their views as scientifically valid and perceived the study
that contradicted their views as deeply flawed.73
Notably, after reading the two competing studies, the participants
did not moderate their views. Instead, they actually expressed more
confidence in their original positions; proponents reported that they
viewed the death penalty even more favorably and opponents
reported that they viewed it even less favorably."4 This polarization
effect suggests that a more-informed public will not necessarily reach
a more-informed conclusion.
In fact, providing additional
information to the public may actually backfire if people only attend
to the studies that confirm their preexisting positions.75
All of this strikes at a much more fundamental problem with the
death penalty debate. The simple truth is that, for the average

69. See, e.g., Silvia Knobloch-Westerwick & Jingbo Meng, Looking the Other Way:
Selective Exposure to Attitude-Consistent and CounterattitudinalPolitical Information, 36
COMM. REs. 426, 440-45 (2009) (finding that people pay closer attention to
information with which they agree).
70. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2098, 2100-06 (1979).

71. Id. at 2100.
72. Id. at 2100-01.
73. Id. at 2101-02.
74. See id. at 2103-04 (finding that subjects exhibited a high degree of
attitude polarization).
75. See JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND
CRIMINALJUSTICE 238-40 (1997) (discussing the results of the Lord et al. study and
concluding that pre-existing beliefs influence how people evaluate information).
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American, the accuracy of these deterrence studies is irrelevant.
Certainly, some people claim to support the death penalty solely
because they believe it reduces crime. In the 2000 presidential
debates, George W. Bush counted himself among this group when he
said, "I think the reason to support the death penalty is because it
saves other people's lives.. . . That's the only reason to be for it."76
Likewise, Nobel Laureate Gary Becker wrote, "I support the use of
capital punishment for persons convicted of murder because, and only
because, I believe it deters murders."77
Maybe President Bush and Professor Becker are correct in their
assessments of their own views. Perhaps, if they were presented with
definitive proof that the death penalty does not reduce crime, they
would alter their positions and oppose capital punishment. However,
for most Americans, this is not the case. Despite consistently
reporting that deterrence is a fundamental-perhaps the most
fundamental-reason for supporting the death penalty,7" most
Americans report that they would not change their position if
conclusive evidence proved they were wrong about its deterrent
effects. 79 This holds true in both directions. Proponents would

76. The Third Gore-Bush PresidentialDebate, COMM'N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
(Oct. 17, 2000) (emphasis added), http://www.debates.org/?page=october-172000-debate-transcript.
77. Gary Becker, On the Economics of CapitalPunishment, HOOVER DIG. (Apr. 30, 2006)
(emphasis added), http://www.hoover.org/research/economics-capital-punishment.
78. See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN & EDMUND F. McGARRELL, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1985 183 (1986) (indicating that deterrence was the
primaryjustification for capital punishment across many demographics in the United
States); Dov Cohen, Law, Social Policy, and Violence: The Impact of Regional Cultures, 70
J. PERSONALIT & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 970 (1996) (discussing a Media General poll that
found that seventy-three percent of respondents reported deterrence as the main
justification for the death penalty, while only seventeen percent said the main
justification was to punish the offender); Charles W. Thomas & Samuel C. Foster, A
Sociological Perspective on Public Support for Capital Punishment, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 641, 655 (1975) (concluding that it is "likely that people support
severe punishment, capital punishment included, because they view punishment as a
problem-solving approach to what they feel are rising rates of crime and increasing
probabilities of victimization"); Thomas, supra note 67, at 1029 ("The controlled
analysis conducted in this study suggests that public support of capital punishment
steins largely from the conviction of many citizens that this and other kinds of
punishment serve the utilitarian goal of deterrence."); see also Neil Vidmar, Retributive
and Utilitarian Motives and Other Correlates of Canadian Attitudes Toward the Death
Penalty, 15 CANADIAN PSYCHOLOGIST 337, 345 (1974) (showing that a plurality of
Canadians give primary consideration to deterrence when deciding whether to
support or oppose the death penalty).
79. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and CapitalPunishment: A Close
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continue to support the death penalty in the absence of a deterrent
effect and opponents would continue to oppose the death penalty,
even if it lowered the murder rate. s° Members of the public arrive at
the debate with preexisting conclusions, and deterrence studies have
little, if any, ability to change their minds.
People's steadfast adherence to their initial positions seems rather
surprising. After all, for much of the past fifty years, deterrence was the
most cited reason for supporting the death penalty. If people cared that
deeply about the deterrent effects, why do they state that they would
continue to support the death penalty even if it did not deter any crime?
There seem to be two possibilities. First, people may view
deterrence as an important reason for supporting the death penalty
but feel that other factors outweigh its absence. Alternatively,
deterrence may serve as a post hoc justification for supporting the
death penalty, rather than an antecedent reason for doing so.
In his HarvardLaw Review article, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence,
Dan Kahan presents a compelling case for this latter explanation.8 '
Specifically, he shows that people use deterrence rhetoric to
justify-but not to inform-their stance on the death penalty. 2 As
Kahan writes, "Deterrence Doesn't Matter."8 3 Instead, people form

Examination of the Vievs of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRiME & DELINQ. 116, 162

(1983); see Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty, 50J. Soc. IssuEs 19, 27, 32 (1994) ("[C]urrent public opinion
poll data continue to support the conclusion that people's attitudes about the death
penalty are not determined by their beliefs in its deterrent effectiveness."); Dan M.
Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 437 (1999) ("[E]ven when
individuals say that deterrence is the most important consideration, it turns out that what
they believe about deterrence is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain their opinion
about the appropriateness of the death penalty.").
80. See Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 79, at 162 (stating that the views of most survey
respondents would not change even if they were mistaken about the effects of deterrence);
David W. Moore, Public Divided Between Death Penalty and Life Imprisonment Without Parole
GALLuP (June 2, 2004), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 1878/public-divided-between-deathpenalty-life-imprisonment-without-parole.aspx
(finding that sixty-nine percent of
proponents would still support capital punishment even if it "does not lower the murder
rate"). For an additional review of this literature, see Ellsworth & Gross, supra note 79, at
26-27, 32 (examining the Ellsworth & Ross study and the Gallup poll).
81. See Kahan, supra note 79, at 436-51 (discussing factors that may contribute to
why people would use deterrence to support the death penalty, even if it is shown
that there is no deterrent effect).
82. See id. at 445-48 (arguing that deterrence is only central in the death
penalty debate because people choose to emphasize it over other arguments
due to its social acceptability).
83. Id. at 437.
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a belief in the rightness or wrongness of the death penalty based
upon their retributivist sentiments. s4
If "[d]eterrence [d]oesn't [m]atter," it seems odd that it drives the
death penalty debate. Kahan, however, has a compelling answer to this
puzzle. He argues that "[c]itizens resort to deterrence rhetoric in
response to norms, principles, and strategic interests that enjoin them
to minimize conflict and expressions of disrespect in their face-to-face
interactions with those who harbor cultural commitments that differ
from their own.""' In other words, deterrence rhetoric is a method of
managing public discourse; it allows people to engage in a civil, orderly
discussion about the death penalty without forcing them into the
uncomfortable and socially undesirable position of challenging their
opponents' moral convictions.8 Whereas a debate about retribution is
necessarily a dispute over the very nature of morality, a debate about
deterrence is simply a factual dispute over the empirical data.8 7
Since it is far more socially acceptable to accuse someone of being
factually mistaken than it is to accuse someone of being morally
deficient, deterrence rhetoric continues to dominate the death penalty
debate.8 8 This situation persists even though the disagreement is really
about which moral norms should govern and, more specifically, the
degree to which retributivist principles should be adopted.

84. See id. at 418 ("Although prominent on both sides of [the death penalty
debate], deterrence arguments don't genuinely explain why most citizens hold the
positions they do ....What does are citizens' understandings of how [the death
penalty debate] cohere[s] with the more general moral commitments of the social
groups that they favor and despise, and what particular resolution[] of [this issue]
would express about the status of these groups in American society.").
85. Id. at 418-19.
86. See id. at 435.
87. See id. at 446.
The conventional expressive arguments on the death penalty are pregnant
with accusation: if I favor the death penalty because it's essential to
vindicating the worth of the victim, then you must be against it because you
don't sufficiently appreciate her worth and overvalue the worth of the
wrongdoer; if I oppose the death penalty because it is administered in a way
that devalues the lives of African Americans, then you must be for it because
you are a racist. In contrast, if I claim to be for/against the death penalty
because it is/is not the penalty most likely to protect lives-a claim that is
abstract enough to fit within essentially all recognizable cultural and
ideological commitments-then I can be seen as saying only that you are
factually misinformed, rather than morally obtuse, for feeling otherwise.
Id.
88. See id. at 433 ("Stated at a high level of abstraction, the idea that the law should
promote security but avoid futility is unlikely to offend any group's deeply held values.").
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Many academics have reached this conclusion as to why deterrence
plays such an outsized role in the death penalty debate. Legal
scholars Neil Vidmar and Phoebe Ellsworth presented a concise
restatement of this position when they wrote, "[E]xpressed belief in
deterrent efficacy may be seen by proponents as the most socially
acceptable justification for favoring the death penalty and thus may
be used as a cover for other, less acceptable reasons."""
Other researchers have likewise argued that deterrence rests upon
a "'statistical/scientific' explanation [that] is perceived as more
'rational,' [and] hence more 'legitimate,"' than unadorned appeals
to values"
Again, "the belief in deterrence is seen as more
'scientific' or more socially desirable than other reasons; people
mention it first because its importance is obvious, not because its
importance is real.""
People make deterrence arguments not
because they are persuaded by them, but rather, because the
scientific nature of the claim provides a seemingly more rational and
92
socially acceptable foundation from which to espouse their position.
It is simply easier to claim that a murderer should be executed
93
because it deters crime than to say, "the bastard deserve [s] it."
In short, deterrence is not a sound constitutional justification for the
death penalty for two reasons. First, the empirical data overwhelmingly
suggests that the death penalty does not have a deterrent effect.
Second, people's sentiments towards the death penalty are not
influenced by the existence of or lack of a deterrent effect. The focus
on deterrence obfuscates the true disagreement over the death penalty
and, in the process, prevents the public from having an honest
discussion about the practice's merits. Ultimately, deterrence cannot
serve as a pillar on which to support the death penalty." In the rest of

89. Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26
STAN. L. Rv. 1245, 1256 (1974).
90. Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic
Politics,5 LAw& POL'Y Q. 157, 174 (1983).
91. Ellsworth & Ross, supranote 79, at 149.
92. See Stolz, supra note 90, at 176 ("The academic debate over whether the
death penalty deters crime provides an aura of rationality, and hence legitimacy, for
the legislative process.").
93. Id.
94. Even if the death penalty had a deterrent effect, that, standing alone, would
be insufficient to place capital punishment on firm constitutional footing. See Donna
H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionalityin Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARiZ. ST. L.J.
527, 532 (2008) ("Regardless of how well a particular sentence may deter crime or
incapacitate criminals, sentences that bear no retributivist resemblance to the
offenses they purport to punish violate Eighth Amendment proportionality.").
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this Article, I argue that retribution is likewise incapable of providing a
constitutional justification for capital punishment.
B.

Retribution

In Gregg v. Georgia," the Supreme Court held that retribution (also
known as retributivism) is another justification for the death penalty.9 6
Retribution can mean many things. To some, it is synonymous with
paying one's debt to society;97 to others, it means revenge; 98 and yet to
others it is simply a shorthand way of describing the method used to deter
vigilante justice.9" In public discourse, people use the term to signify a
variety of concepts. l.
Indeed, the philosopher John Cottingham
famously advanced nine distinct understandings of retribution.''
Despite the public's diverse use of the term, most philosophers
have coalesced around a unified conception of retribution-namely
that criminals should be punished because, and only because, they
deserve it.'1 2
According to this view, punishment is entirely
retrospective.
A retributivist looks to the past and assigns a

95. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 183-84. In recent decisions, several Justices have gone so far as to
argue that retribution should be the primary rationale for the death penalty. See
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79-80 (2008) (Stevens,J., concurring) (plurality opinion)
(observing that, in the absence of empirical support for the death penalty's deterrent
effect, "[w]e are left, then, with retribution as the primary rationale for imposing the
death penalty. And indeed, it is the retribution rationale that animates much of the
remaining enthusiasm for the death penalty"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (writing that "retribution provides
the main justification for capital punishment").
97. Under this conception, the criminal is viewed as having taken unfair advantage
of the law-abiding members of society. By enduring a state-imposed punishment, the
criminal pays back his debt and restores the status quo that existed prior to the crime.
SeeHerbert Morris, Persons and Punishment,52 MONIST 475, 477-78 (1968).

98. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84.
99. See id. at 183 (declaring that, in an ordered society, retribution is necessary
to inspire confidence in legal processes and discourage reliance on self-help).
100.

See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-1953 REPORT, 1953,

Cm. 8932, at 17 (U.K.) (observing that "[d]iscussion of the principle of retribution is
apt to be confused because the word is not always used in the same sense"); see also
Don E. Scheid, Kant's Retributivism, 93 ETHIcS 262, 262 (1983) (noting that the term

"retributivism" has had diverse meanings over time).
101. John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238-46 (1979)
(discussing the nine conceptions of retribution:
repayment, desert, penalty,
minimalism, satisfaction, fair play, placation, annulment, and denunciation).
102.

See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 87 (2010)

("Retribtifivism... is the view that punishment isjustified by the desert of the offender.").
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punishment based solely on the wrongdoer's immoral actions.'1 3
Prospective concerns-such as deterring crimes and satisfying the
victim's desire for revenge-are irrelevant to the retributivist calculus.
The Supreme Court has generally endorsed this understanding of
retribution."" Therefore, it is worth exploring further.
Imagine that a young man named Gary robs a convenience store
in your town." 5 During the attempted escape, Gary shoots and kills
a police officer who was responding to the crime scene. Ultimately,
Gary is apprehended by another officer, and at trial, the jury
convicts him of felony murder. 10 6 Prior to sentencing, Gary inherits
a sizable fortune from his uncle. The fortune is so large that we can
be sure that he will never commit another crime. Accordingly,
state-imposed punishment is not necessary to prevent Gary from
In other words, specific
engaging in future criminal activity.
deterrence cannotjustify punishment in this case.
Suppose further that, in the interests of general deterrence, Gary
will pretend to be punished. At regular intervals, he will report to
prison to be filmed in a jumpsuit in order to give society the
impression that he is serving a lengthy prison sentence. In reality,
Gary will be living a luxurious life on his own private island and will
use his vast fortune to ensure that the ruse is never discovered. In
this scenario, the goals of general deterrence are satisfied, and
society's desire for revenge is satisfied. On top of that, the ruse costs
the state less than if it had actually imprisoned Gary. With this in
mind, is there any reason left to punish Gary?
Most people think so. 0 7 They have a strong intuition that fairness
demands Gary receive his just deserts and that only by actually

103.

E.g.,

CITIZENSHIP

LODE WALGRAVE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, SELF-INTEREST AND RESPONSIBLE

59 (2008).

104. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(describing the "retributive end" as "ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts")
(quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)); Thompson v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 815, 836 n.44 (1988) (same); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)
("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.").
105. This example is drawn from MOORE, supra note 102, at 99-101.
106. For a discussion of the felony murder rule, see Guyora Binder, Making the Best of
Felony Murder,91 B.U. L. REv. 403, 413 (2011) (defining felony murder as a punishment for
some unintended homicides committed during the commission of particular felonies).
107. See MOORE, supra note 102, at 99 (noting that most people's initial reaction is an
"intuitive judgment" that calls for the punishment of such crimes); Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Hatred. A Qualified Defeme, in FORGIvENEss AND MERcY 88, 90 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean
Hampton eds., 1988) (describing this strong emotional judgment as "retributive hatred").
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imposing punishment can society fulfill this requirement."°8 Under
this view, even if no other benefits will follow, the State is morally
required to punish Gary for the simple reason that he deserves it.
This idea is the central feature of retribution.0 9
Although the above example illustrates this theory of punishment,
it will prove helpful to identify specific criteria. In particular, there
are three main principles that define retribution:
It is intrinsically morally good-good even in the absence of any
other goods-when the State imposes a just punishment on
someone who has committed a legal offense.
It is intrinsicallymorally bad-bad despite any other goods that may
follow-to punish an innocent person or to inflict a
disproportionate punishment on a guilty person.
A just punishment must be proportional to the severity of the
crime committed."10
The first principle is a positive claim. It indicates the appropriate
actions that should be taken against those who have committed
crimes."' Specifically, the principle states that it is good, for its own
sake, when a criminal is punished." 2 In contrast to the first principle,
the second principle presents a negative claim. It outlines what actions
must not be done. According to this principle, the State may neither
punish innocent people nor punish guilty people more severely than
their crimes warrant."' This principle holds even if substantial benefits
108. See, e.g.,James Rachels, Punishment and Desert, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 470, 470
(Hugh LaFollette ed., 1997) ("Retributivism-the idea that wrongdoers should be
'paid back' for their wicked deeds-fits naturally with many people's feelings.").
109. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited, 80 PROC. &
ADDRESSESAM. PHIL. ASS'N 45, 52 (2006) (defining a retributivist as "a person who believes
that the primaryjustification for punishing a criminal is that the criminal deserves it").
110. See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Sept. 21, 2014),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fa112014/enties/jusice-retributive
(advancing both
positive and negative desert claims in the context of retributive proportionality).
111. Id.
112. See Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOsOPHY 30
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967) ("[R]etributivists... maintain that the punishment of
crime is right in itself, that it is fitting that the guilty should suffer, and thatjustice, or
the moral order, requires the institution of punishment. This, however, is not to
justify punishment but, rather, to deny that it needs anyjtstification ....
Its intrinsic
value is appreciated immediately or intuitively."); MOORE, supra note 102, at 87-88
("[T]he good that punishment achieves is that someone who deserves it gets it.
Punishment of the guilty is thus for the retributivist an intrinsicgood, not the merely
instrumentalgood that it may be to the utilitarian or rehabilitative theorist.").
113. Walen, supra note 110. See HyMAN GROss, A THEORYOFCRIMINALJUSTICE 436
(1979) (positing that a disproportionate punishment is necessarily a punishment
without guilt and is, therefore, prohibited); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
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would follow from its violation. For instance, it would be morally
impermissible for the State to imprison a man for nineteen years for
stealing a loaf of bread, even if it could be shown that doing so would
prevent all future robberies." 4 Prospective considerations are not
relevant to the retributivist calculus. If a person does not deserve to be
'5
punished, he may not, under any circumstances, be punished.
Finally, the third principle of retribution helps locate the appropriate
sanction for a crime. It achieves this by requiring that punishments be
proportional to the crimes committed." 6
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has upheld all three
of these retributivist principles: (1) the guilty must be punished, (2)
the innocent must not be punished, and (3) punishments must satisfy
For our purposes, the third
the demands of proportionality. 7
criterion is the most important. According to the Court, for a
punishment to be proportional, it must be equal in severity to the
crime that was committed."' This means that wrongdoers may only

140 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1776) [hereinafter
KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS] ("Punishment by a court.., can never be inflicted
merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil
society. It must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime. For
a man can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another ...").
114.
See MOORE, supra note 102, at 87 ("The good that is achieved by punishing,
on this view, has nothing to do with future states of affairs, such as the prevention of
crime or the maintenance of social cohesion.").
115.
See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 358 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is
axiomatic that the major justification for concluding that a given defendant deserves to
be punished is that he committed a crime."); Scheid, supra note 100, at 262 (stating that
in retributivist theory, "concern for crime control is not morally relevant to the
justification of punishment.... [W] hether a person may be punished and, if so, to what
extent are questions to be decided solely by reference to one's past legal offense.").
Robert S. Gerstein, CapitalPunishment- "Cruel and Unusual"?: A Retributivist
116.
Response, 85 ETHICS 75, 77 (1974) ("The purpose of punishment is to restore the
balance ofjustice within the community, not firther to derange it.").
117.
SeeRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007) ("[A] sentence [must]
reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely, (a) 'just punishment' (retribution), (b)
deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation."); United States v. LaBonte, 520
U.S. 751, 779 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that "the basic goals of
punishment" are "deterrence, incapacitation, just deserts, [and] rehabilitation");
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("The constitutional principle of
proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century.");
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (describing
the sentencing phase as an opportunity for the judge to "mete outjust deserts").
118.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) ("With respect to
retribution-the interest in seeing that the offender gets his 'just deserts'-the
severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the
offender."); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution
MORALS
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in the words of the
be punished to the degree they deserve." 9 1 Or,
20
deserts."
'just
their
get
must
Court, criminals
As Justice White wrote, "[T]hose who engage in serious criminal
conduct which poses a substantial risk of violence... deserve serious
punishment. '12' By extension, those who engage in minor criminal
conduct that poses only a minimal risk of harm deserve lesser
punishments. 22 Although the Court's formulation provides a general
principle, it does not completely clear up the meaning of proportionality.
Fortunately, work in philosophy can point us to a more concrete
understanding of the term. Philosophers have identified two basic
Cardinal
cardinal and ordinal.
senses of proportionality:
proportionality requires absolute parity between the severity of the
crime and the severity of the punishment. 123 Ordinal proportionality,
by contrast, requires only relative parity between the two. 124

This

rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal
culpability of the criminal offender."); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A society must punish those who transgress its rules.
When the offense is severe, the punishment should be of proportionate severity.").
119. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284 ("The principle that a punishment should be
proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence.").
120. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (opining that a criminal's
punishment must comport with the individual's participation in and moral
responsibility for the crime. "Putting [someone] to death to avenge two killings that
he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his
just deserts."); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50, 68 (2010) (establishing that
"defendants who do not kill, [or] intend to kill ... are categorically less deserving' of
harsher penalties than murderers, and juveniles are similarly "less deserving of the
most serious forms of punishment" because of their "lessened culpability" (emphasis
added)); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13 (emphasizing the need for an individual's
punishment to be tailored to his personal responsibility); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 326 (1989) (discussing whether a mentally retarded individual who had been
convicted of murder "deserve[d] to be sentenced to death" or "was not sufficiently
culpable to deserve the death penalty"), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 609 (1880) ("[T]he guilty parties
[who committed a series of 'stupendous frauds'] deserve severe punishment.").
121. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 626 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgments of the Court).
122. See Graham,560 U.S. at 50.
123. See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionalityin the Philosophy of Punishment, 16 CRIME
& JUST. 55, 83 (1992) ("Cardinal proportionality requires that a reasonable
proportion be maintained between overall levels of punitiveness and the gravity of
the criminal conduct.").
124. See id. at 79 ("Ordinal proportionality is the requirement that penalties be
scaled according to the comparative seriousness of crimes.").
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simply means that more severe crimes must be punished more
severely and less severe crimes must be punished less severely. It says
nothing, however, regarding the appropriate, absolute severity of the
punishment. To put it briefly, cardinal proportionality deals with "the
scale's overall magnitude and anchoring points," and ordinal
25
proportionality deals with "the internal structure of a penalty scale."1
For much of the past, cardinal proportionality dominated. Some
of its most noteworthy incarnations are the Biblical principle of lex
talionis126 and Hammurabi's Code. 27 Immanuel Kant, perhaps this
position's most notable defender, 28 summarizes it as follows:
"[W]hatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the
people, that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you insult
yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you strike
him, you strike yourself; if you kill him, you kill yourself.'' 29 In short,
lex talionis "requires imposing a harm on a criminal identical to the
one he imposed on his victim."' 30
Although this doctrine may seem plausible in certain
circumstances-indeed, proponents of the death penalty frequently
invoke this conception of punishment to justify their claim that
murderers should be executed31'-its dictates are difficult to apply in
many situations and are downright impossible in others. Consider
the appropriate punishment for a man who kidnaps a child. Should
society kidnap that man's child? If so, what should be done if he is
childless? Or consider a woman who steals twenty dollars. Is justice

125.

Id. at 76.

126.

CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 820 (Angus Stevenson & Maurice Waite
eds., 12th ed. 2011) (defining lex talionisas "the law of retaliation, whereby a punishment
resembles the offence committed in kind and degree"); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 825 (Jess Stein & Laurence Urdang eds., 1966) (likewise
defining lex talionis as "the principle or law of retaliation that a punishment inflicted
should correspond in degree and kind to the offense of the wrongdoer....").
127. See generally L.W. KING, THE CODE or HAMMURABI 29-50 (1915).
128. See Benn, supra note 112, at 30 (calling Kant "[t]he most
thoroughgoing retributivist[]").
129. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 113, at 141.
130. Russ Shafer-Landau, The Failure of Retributivism, 82 PHIL. STUD. 289, 299
(1996) [hereinafter Shafer-Landau, Failureof Retributivism].
131.
See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OFJUSTICE 139, 141 (John

Ladd trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1999) (1797)

[hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICAL

("If, however, [a person] has committed a murder, he must die. In this
case, there is no substitute that will satisfy the requirements of legal justice. There is
no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive even under the most
miserable conditions, and consequently there is also no equality between the crime
and the retribution unless the criminal isjudicially condemned and put to death.").
ELEMENTS]
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served simply by taking twenty dollars from her? That outcome seems
far too lenient. Nonetheless, a strict conception of lex talionis
prescribes precisely that punishment.
In light of these deficiencies, some scholars have tried to save the
doctrine by altering its precise parity requirement.
Kant, for
instance, endorsed a version of lex talionis that would call for the thief
1 32
to lose all rights to property, not just the value of what he stole.

Kant believed that, because a thief undermines property rights for
everyone, the thief, himself, should be denied property rights. 3 3 This
modified principle, however, seems far too harsh a punishment for
most thefts. After all, in Kant's own words, such a penalty reduces the
thief "to the status of a slave for a certain time, or permanently if the
state sees fit."1

4

Ultimately, such efforts to rework lex talionis failed,

either because they prescribed punishments that seem patently
unreasonable in certain situations, or because they advanced
principles that are too imprecise to provide much guidance in
35
selecting punishments for specific crimes.
Cardinal proportionality may have its problems, but pure ordinal
proportionality fares no better. Instead of meting out a punishment
that is identical to the crime, an ordinal system begins by
circumscribing a set of available punishments. Next, it calls for
potential crimes and potential punishments to be ranked by their
severity and matched accordingly.136 The most severe crime would
correspond to the most severe punishment, the second most severe
crime would correspond to the second most severe punishment, and
so on, all the way down to the point at which the least severe crime
corresponds to the least severe punishment.3 7

132.

Id. at 139.

133. See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 113, at 142 ("Whoever steals
makes the property of everyone else insecure and therefore deprives himself (by the
principle of retribution) of security in any possible property.").
134.

Id. For other efforts to salvage the doctrine of lex talionis see, e.g., Jeremy

Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARiz. L. REv. 25, 32-33 (1992) (describing a new
understanding of the lex talionis principle in which the punishment must be "of the
same type" of action as the original offense but need not be "the same act").
135.

See Shafer-Landau, Failure of Retributivism, supra note 130, at 299-303 (criticizing

recent attempts to save lex talionis for "fail[ing] to yield determinate advice about how much
to punish"); see also Russ Shafer-Landau, Retributivism andDesert 81 PAC. PHIL.Q. 189, 197-98
(2000) [hereinafter Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert] (examining how the /ex talionis

principle is not always a morallyjustified form of punishment).
136.

See Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert, supra note 135, at 202.

137.

Id.
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As intuitive as this approach may seem, ordinal proportionality has a
major flaw. By locating the appropriate punishment on a relative scale,
the system provides no guidance regarding the absolute severity of the
punishment. It only tells us whether a certain crime warrants a more or
less severe punishment than another crime, not whether an appropriate
punishment for either crime would be life in prison or a ten-dollar fine.
This is a significant problem. Imagine a society that has ranked all
crimes and punishments by their severity. So, too, every crime has a
matching punishment based on its relative severity. With respect to
punishments, this particular society has denoted that the minimum
acceptable punishment is twenty years in prison and the maximum
acceptable punishment is fifty years in prison. Under this system,
petty offenses-such as jaywalking-will result in twenty years in
prison. Ordinal proportionality is satisfied, but our sense of justice
likely is not. This is the case because ordinal proportionality does not
delimit the scope of potential punishments and, therefore, can mandate a
punishment that any reasonable person would acknowledge as being
disproportionate to the crime committed.138 For this reason, very few
philosophers have defended a strong version of ordinal proportionality.
Instead, most modern retributivist philosophers endorse a mixed
account that combines elements of both cardinal and ordinal
proportionality. Specifically, they rely on cardinal proportionality to
lay out the range of acceptable punishments and to locate several key
anchoring points."3 9 Then they employ ordinal proportionality to
develop the remainder of the penalty scale, analyzing the relative
severity of other crimes to locate the appropriate punishments. 40
This approach holds that punishments should be commensurate
with, but not necessarily identical to, the crime."'

138. See id. at 202-04.
139. It should be noted that modern versions of cardinal proportionality vary
somewhat from the doctrine of lex talionis. Whereas lex talionis indicates that justice
requires a very strong equivalence in both kind and degree between the criminal
activity and the mandated punishment, more recent retributivist philosophers
emphasize only the "degree" requirement. They generally start from the position
that monetary sanctions and imprisonment are the acceptable forms of punishments.
This claim precludes the State from imposing a strict "eye for an eye" regime of
punishment. Instead, the system may be more closely thought of as requiring
equality between the amount of suffering the criminal caused and the amount of
suffering he will endure as punishment.
140. For a thorough discussion of this mixed account, see JOHN KLEINIG,
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 123-24 (1973) and ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 137-41 (2005).

141.

See, e.g.,

NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw

179-80 (1982)
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The Supreme Court's decisions most closely adhere to this mixed
account of proportionality. Although the Justices have not specified
any lower boundary on punishments available to the State, they have
relied on the Eighth Amendment to set an upper limit on the severity
of punishments."' 2 Notably, in Wilkerson v. Utah,"' the Court held
that "punishments of torture, such as [drawing and quartering,
public dissection, burning alive, and disembowelment] are forbidden
by that amendment to the Constitution.""'4
According to the Court, the harshest constitutional punishment is
the death penalty. As such, it must be reserved for criminals who
commit the most heinous crimes (i.e. those involving the taking of
another person's life)."' The Supreme Court has used cardinal
proportionality to set a maximum punishment and to endorse the
principle that murderers can be killed by the State. Likewise, the
Justices have held that sentencing someone to death for a lesser
46
crime would fail the Eighth Amendment's test of proportionality.1
The proportionality test, however, goes in two directions.
7
Punishing someone too leniently is, likewise, a severe violation."'
This conclusion follows from the retributive belief that, not only does
society have a right to punish criminals, but criminals, themselves,
have a right to be punished. 14'8 By choosing to punish someone too
("'[A] deserved punishment'... does not mean the infliction on the criminal
offender of a pain precisely equivalent to that which he has inflicted on his victim; it
means rather a 'not undeserved punishment which bears a proportional relationship
in a hierarchy of punishments to the harm for which the criminal has been
convicted."'); see also Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY
128, 137 (Jeffrie G. Murphy &Jean Hampton eds., 1988) (arguing for comparability,
but not identicalness, between crime and punishment).
142. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,133 (1878).
143. 99 U.S. 130, 133 (1878).
144. Id. at 136.
145. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e
must consider whether the punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to
the crime for which it is imposed."); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286,
304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[R]etribution in this context means that
criminals are put to death because they deserve it.").
146. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders... whose extreme culpability makes them
'the mostdeserving of execution."' (quotingAtkins v.Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))).
147. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) ("A punishment that fails
the Eighth Amendment test of proportionality because disproportionate to the
offender's blameworthiness by definition is notjustly deserved.").
148. Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1452 (1990) (reviewing JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1990)).
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leniently, we fail to respect that person's human dignity. Only by
handing down a proportionate sanction does society treat that person
as a rational being who is responsible for his actions."'
In the following Part, I argue that the death penalty, as currently
imposed, violates the principle of proportionality enshrined in the
Eighth Amendment. Drawing upon philosophical theories of harm
and death, I show that the death penalty is not nearly as severe as the
Court maintains.
In fact, as currently practiced, it is not a
punishment at all. For this reason, retribution cannot provide a legal
justification for the death penalty. In the absence of such a rationale,
the Supreme Court has no legal basis on which to uphold the
constitutionality of capital punishment.
II.

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS NOT A PUNISHMENT

The death penalty is the worst possible punishment.5 ' This belief is held
so widely that the courts have never stopped to consider its truth. It is
taken to be so obvious that no justification is necessary. Indeed, on
repeated occasions, the Supreme Court has simply proclaimed, without
argument, that the death penalty is the "most severe punishment.'' 5
If forced to answer why the death penalty merits a place at the top
of the punishment hierarchy, what would the Court say? How would
the justices defend their intuition that, "[i]n comparison to all other
punishments today ....

the deliberate extinguishment of human life

by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity"?'5 2
Although the Justices do not say much about this issue, it is
reasonable to think that they would respond by emphasizing the
badness of death.'5 3 They would likely argue that death is the

149. See KANT, METAPHYSicAL ELEMENTS, supra note 131, at 139.
150.
This statement is not to suggest that the death penalty is the worst
punishment imaginable. I merely mean that people view the death penalty as
the worst possible punishment that society inflicts.
See, e.g., Dan Markel,
Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1163, 1175 (2009) (acknowledging the existence of more severe penalties
than capital punishment, "such as prolonged inflictions of extreme pain and
mental distress imposed upon the defendant leading up to eventual death by
torture-or attaching the punishment to the offender's children, which may
effect [sic] a fate worse than death for the offender").
151.
E.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012) (plurality opinion);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (plurality opinion).
152. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,291 (1972) (Brennan,J., concurring) (per curiam).
153. Id. at 287 ("The only explanation for the uniqueness of death is its extreme
severity. Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its
finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to death in
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ultimate punishment because it deprives us of life. Ultimately, life is
all we have; without it, we are nothing. Accordingly, death is the
greatest loss of all. This is still a bit vague, so it would be useful to
specify the precise ways in which something can be bad for us.
Taking this step will allow us to see the strongest possible arguments
that the Supreme Court could marshal in support of the view that the
death penalty is the worst possible punishment.
To start, think of some bad events that have happened in your life so
far. Many were probably trivial things like stubbing your toe or getting
a paper cut. Perhaps others were more severe, such as losing your
wallet or breaking a family heirloom. A few may even have been life
changing, such as the death of a parent or spouse. When you really
think about it, over the course of your life, you have experienced a
wide variety and an incredible quantity of harmful events.
Despite this apparent diversity, philosophers have managed to sort all
the potential harms one could experience into three categories.' 54
These three categories illustrate the three ways in which any event, the
death penalty included, could be bad. First, something can be
intrinsicallybad for us.'55 Pain is a perfect example of an intrinsic bad; it
is something that you work very hard to avoid because of its inherently
unpleasant nature. Pain has a direct and observable negative effect on
your life. All things equal, you have a very strong preference not to
15 '
experience it. For this reason, pain is an intrinsic bad."
The second way something can cause harm is by being instrumentally
bad for us.'57 Consider, for instance, losing your job. The mere fact
that you no longer have to go to work is not bad in itself. Initially, you
may even be delighted by the situation. As time goes on, however, bad
effects will follow. Without another source of income, yourjoblessness
will lead to poverty and hunger. Because losing your job eventually
leads to pain and suffering, it is an instrumental bad.
terms of physical and mental suffering.").
154. For a more detailed discussion of the three types of badness, see SHELLY KAGAN,
DEATH 210-11 (2012) and STEVEN LUPER, THE PHILOSOPHYOF DEATH 82-83 (2009).
155. See KAGAN, supranote 154, at 210.

156. There is philosophical debate over whether events can be intrinsic bads.
Some philosophers believe that only experiential states can be intrinsically bad for
us; others, however, argue that certain events (such as the occurrence of a headache)
are so intimately tied to experiential states that the events themselves are intrinsically
bad for us. See, e.g., Dale Dorsey, Headaches, Lives and Value, 21 UTILITAS 36, 37-38

(2009) (arguing that headaches are intrinsically bad). The latter view-that events
can be intrinsic bads-allows one to build a stronger case for the badness of the
death penalty. Accordingly, I adopt that position for the purposes of this Article.
157.

See KAGAN, supra note 155, at 211.
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This is not to say that losing yourjob is always an instrumental bad.
Imagine that you are fired from your job. On the following day, you
decide to take a walk with your newfound free time. During the walk,
you stumble upon a winning lottery ticket that has a payout of one
hundred million dollars. It is clear that, in this scenario, losing your
job was not instrumentally bad. After all, had you still been working,
you would have never stumbled upon the winning lottery ticket.
This nuance illustrates a fundamental distinction between intrinsic
bads and instrumental bads. The former are bad by their very nature
and should be avoided in their own right. 5 The latter are only bad
in virtue of their contingent effects. For this reason, people do not
seek to avoid instrumental bads for their own sake, but rather
because of the future intrinsic bads that they will bring about.
The third and final way something can harm us is by being
comparatively bad.'5 9 This type of bad is relational. To determine
whether a given event is bad, one must compare the state of affairs in
a world where the event has occurred with the state of affairs in the
closest possible world where the event has not occurred. 6
6
Consider the following scenario:' '
A person (let's call her Amy) gets into two law schools, Law School A
and Law School B. Amy chooses to go to Law School A, which does
not have a criminal law clinic. After graduation, she obtains ajob as a
corporate lawyer. Amy finds her work moderately satisfying and lives a
reasonably good life. However, if Amy had chosen to go to Law School
B, which does have a criminal law clinic, she would have enrolled in
the clinic and discovered that she had a real passion for criminal law.
Amy then would have pursued a career at the Department of Justice

158.

See Roderick M. Chisholm, Objectives and Intrinsic Value, inJENSEITS VON

261, 262 (Rudolf Hailer ed., 1972) ("And what do we mean
when we say that a state of affairs is intrinsically good, or intrinsically bad-as
distinguished from being merely instrumentally good or instrumentally bad? I
suggest this: a state of affairs is intrinsically good if it is necessarily good-if it is
good in every possible world in which it occurs.").
159. For an overview of comparativism, see Steven Luper, Death, in STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. § 2.1 (Oct. 17, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2014/entries/death. For a detailed discussion, see LUPER, supra note 154, at 82-84.
160. See LUPER, supra note 154, at 7-8 ("Comparativism holds that something is in
our interests just when it benefits us or when it would benefit us if it occurred, and
that something benefits us just when it makes our lives better than they would have
been. Similarly, a thing is against our interests just when it does or would harm us,
and it harms usjust when it makes our lives worse than they would have been.").
161. This example is adapted from FRED FELDMAN, CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE
REAPER 137 (1992).
SEIN UND NICHTSEIN
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and eventually become the U.S. Attorney General. The life Amy would
have led if she had attended Law School B would have been
substantially better than the life she actually did lead.
Amy's decision to go to Law School A was comparatively bad for
her. If she had chosen to go to Law School B, her life would have
been unquestionably better. The decision was not bad in an intrinsic
or instrumental sense. Keep in mind that she still enjoyed a
reasonably good life. Nonetheless, the decision to attend Law School
A was comparatively bad for Amy because her life was not as good as
it otherwise could have been.
These three categories (intrinsic bads, instrumental bads, and
comparative bads) show the three ways in which the death penalty
could be bad for the person who is executed. In the following three
sections, I will examine each of these possibilities and argue that none
of them provide a retributive justification for the death penalty.'62
A.

CapitalPunishment is Not IntrinsicallyBad

The most basic argument that one can muster in favor of the
badness of the death penalty is simply that it is intrinsically bad-bad
in and of itself. Certain forms of the death penalty can be
intrinsically bad. Indeed, for much of recorded history, methods of
execution were specifically designed to be painful.' 63 Even more
recent forms of the death penalty, such as hanging or lethal gas, are
likewise intrinsically bad.'64 Today, however, the primary method of
162. None of these arguments should be taken to suggest that murder is morally
acceptable. The claim that the death is not bad for the one who dies does not imply
that it is morally permissible to kill others. As the philosopher Stephen Rosenbaum
observes, in order to make this leap, "One would need to justify the principle that
killing humans is morally wrong only if death is bad for them." Stephen E.
Rosenbaum, Concepts of Value and Ideas about Death, in THE METAPHYSICS AND ETHics OF
DEATH: NEW ESSAYS 149, 162 (James Stacey Taylor ed., 2013) [hereinafter Rosenbaum,
Concepts of Value]. Rosenbaum rejects this possibility, writing, "I do not readily see how
one could argue plausibly for this thesis, and I am unaware of any argument for the
principle." Id.; see also Mikel Burley, Epicurus, Death, and the Wrongness of Killing, 53
INQUIRY 68, 73-79 (2010) (arguing that Epicurus's position is consistent with the belief
that killing is wrong because the immorality of murder is a "basic moral certainty").
163. The Death Penalty: Revenge Is the Mother of Invention, TIME (Jan. 4, 1983),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,950826,00.html.
164. SeeJacob Weisberg, This Is Your Death, NEW REPUBLIC,July 1, 1991, at 23. For
instance, during a hanging, "the dangling person feels cervical pain, and probably
suffers from an acute headache as well, a result of the rope closing off the veins of
the neck." Id.at 24. During an electrocution, the prisoner likely "feels himself being
burned to death and suffocating." Id. A prisoner who is executed via a gas chamber
"unquestionably experienc[es] pain and extreme anxiety .... The pain begins
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execution in all thirty-five states that sanction the death penalty is
lethal injection. 6 5 Accordingly, since we are concerned with the
death penalty as applied in the United States, the question that needs
to be examined is whether lethal injection is intrinsically bad.
Every so often a lethal injection goes horribly wrong, and the
media presents these rare cases as proof that lethal injection is
intrinsically bad.'66 For instance, during a 2014 execution in Ohio,
the condemned, Dennis McGuire, experienced "repeated cycles of
snorting [and] gurgling... , appearing to writhe in pain."'67
Witnesses reported that "[i]t looked and sounded as though he
[were] suffocating."'" This process continued for twenty-six minutes
before McGuire finally went silent and died. 69
That same year in Oklahoma, Clayton Lockett was executed using
an experimental drug protocol. 70 Ten minutes after receiving the
first drug, Locket was declared unconscious.'17 The executioners
administered the remaining two drugs, but three minutes later,
"Lockett began breathing heavily, writhing on the gurney, clenching
his teeth and straining to lift his head off the pillow. "172
He
proceeded to speak the words, "Man," "I'm not," and "[S]omething's
wrong.' 73 From the time of the first injection,
it was forty-three
174
minutes until Lockett died of a heart attack.
immediately and is felt in the arms, shoulders, back, and chest. The sensation is
similar to the pain felt by a person during a heart attack, where essentially the heart
is being deprived of oxygen." Id. at 26.
165. SeeMethods ofExecution, DEATH PENALTYINFO. Crm, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
methods-execution.
166. The Associated Press, Family Sues in ProtractedOhio Execution, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan.
25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/26/us/family-sues-in-protracted-ohioexecution.html [hereinafter Protracted Ohio Execution] (detailing a painful legal
injection that caused calls for a moratorium on capital punishment in the state).
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also Erica Goode, After a Prolonged Execution in Ohio, Questions Over
'Cruel and Unusual',N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
01/18/us/prolonged-execution-prompts-debate-over-death-penalty-methods.hml?_r-0
(McGuire's daughter observed that "[h]e started making all these horrible, horrible
noises ....He was suffering.").
169. See ProtractedOhio Execution, supra note 167.
170. Tracey Connor, Oklahoma Inmate Dies After Execution IsBotched, NBC (Apr. 29,
2014, 8:35 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/lethal-injection/oklahomainmate-dies-after-execution-botched-n93156.
171. Id.
172. Associated Press, Oklahoma Nixes 2nd Execution of the Night After Botching 1st,
N.Y. POST (Apr. 29, 2014, 11:25 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/04/29/oklahomanixes-2nd-execution-of-the-night-after-botching-lst.
173. Josh Levs et al., Oklahoma's Botched Lethal Injection Marks New Front in Battle
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As unfortunate as these incidents are, they are quite rare. 175 They
also do not address whether a properly administered lethal injection
is intrinsically bad. They only show that improperly administered
lethal injections can be intrinsically bad.
When a lethal injection is administered correctly, the criminal
experiences neither pain nor suffering. This point is so widely
accepted that even parties challenging the constitutionality of the
death penalty agree that "if administered as intended, [lethal
injection] will result in a painless death."' 76 Notably, the overwhelming
majority of lethal injections are properly administered.' According to
a comprehensive study of U.S. executions, this 78accounts for
approximately ninety-three percent of lethal injections.'
Although the exact protocols vary among the states, they all begin
with the administration of a sedative, such as sodium thiopental,
pentobarbital, or midazolam.' 79 Historically, most states have used
two additional agents designed to paralyze the prisoner-including
the diaphragmatic muscles that control breathing-and induce
cardiac arrest. 80 The recent trend, however, is to forgo these other
drugs and use only a lethal dose of one of the aforementioned
sedatives-a process that has been adopted in about half the states.181

Over Executions, CNN (Sep. 8, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/30/

us/oklahoma-botched-execution.
174. Id.
175. See Michael L. Radelet, Examples of Past-Furman Botched Execution, DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-botched-executions
(last visited Aug. 9, 2015) (providing forty-six examples of botched executions).
176. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49, 62 (2008) (plurality opinion).
177.

AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES: BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA'S

120 (2014) (indicating that between 1980 and 2010, about seven
percent of lethal injections were botched. Because many of these executions were
classified as botched due to relatively minor difficulties, even this figure likely
overstates the true number of criminals who suffered intrinsic bads).
178. See id.; see also Austin Sarat et al., Gruesome Spectacles: The Cultural Reception of
Botched Executions in America, 1890-1920, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 1, 21 (2012)
(categorizing lethal injections as "botched" if any of six criteria are met).
179. For a comprehensive review of each state's protocols, see State by State Lethal
Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., [hereinafter State by State Lethal Injection],
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection.
180. See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1333-34
(2014) ('The typical formula... consists of a serial sequence of three drugs: sodium
thiopental, a barbiturate anesthetic that brings about deep unconsciousness; pancuronium
bromide, a total muscle relaxant that paralyzes all voluntary muscles and causes suffocation;
DEATH PENALTY

and potassium chloride, a toxin that induces irreversible cardiac arrest.").

181. See State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 179 (noting that fourteen of the
thirty-five states with inmates on death row have adopted a one-drug protocol).
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Doctors believe that this method further reduces the opportunity for
botched executions and thereby better ensures that the prisoner
experiences no pain.'82 Dr. Mark J. Heath, an anesthesiologist at
Columbia University and an expert on lethal injection, stated that he
has "not seen a single complaint, not an unhappy warden or family or
anybody, from the single-drug barbiturate approach."' 83
Minimization of pain is not simply a coincidence; it is a constitutional
requirement. The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to ensure
that the death penalty does not cause undue suffering-consistently
holding that capital punishment "must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain."'84 Notably, "the Constitution does not
85
demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions."'
Because every form of capital punishment has some risk of going wrong

and causing pain, this is a necessary concession. Without it, the Court
could not hold that the death penalty is constitutional. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the Supreme Court believes lethal injection will best minimize
suffering, describing it as the "method of execution believed to be the
186
most humane available."'
182.
See Denise Grady, Three-DrugProtocol Persistsfor Lethal Injections, Despite Ease of
Using One, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/
science/th ree-drug-protocol-persists-for-lethal-injections-despite-ease-of-usingone.html?_r=0 ("Physicians have long known that large doses of single drugscertain sedatives or anesthetics-can take a life painlessly, and with far less distress
than the three-drug cocktail causes if the injection is botched.").
Id.
183.
184. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that a punishment is
unconstitutional if it "is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering").
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (plurality opinion).
185.
186. Id. at 62. Likewise, a federal district court has observed that "[t]here is
general agreement that lethal injection is at present the most humane type of
execution available and is far preferable to the sometimes barbaric means employed
in the past." Hill v. Lockhart, 791 F. Supp. 1388, 1394 (E.D. Ark. 1992); see also Ex
parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (noting that the "Texas
Legislature substituted death by lethal injection as a means of execution in lieu of
electrocution for the reason it would be a more humane and less spectacular form of
execution"). Such praise, of course, does not mean that the death penalty is now
beyond reproach. States should continue working to improve the system. As a first
measure, better training procedures and more direct physician involvement would
help reduce the already low rate of mishandled lethal injections. See Deborah W.
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty,
76 FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 77, 91 (2007). An even superior option-and one that would
almost completely eliminate the potential for error-is to switch from lethal injection
to nitrogen asphyxiation. This latter method has recently gained serious attention
and is currently being considered for possible use in Oklahoma. Markus

1410

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1377

Even if doctors are wrong about the painlessness of lethal injection,
my argument regarding capital punishment's unconstitutionality still
survives. This is because, to the extent a properly executed lethal
injection causes any pain, it is undeniably minor and brief. The
brevity and slightness of the pain preclude the death penalty from
being a proportionate punishment for the most severe crimes. In this
circumstance, it would still violate the Eighth Amendment's
proportionality requirement.
Before concluding, it is worth discussing two medical procedures
that provide strong reason to believe any pain caused by the death
penalty is both brief and slight. The first is animal euthanasia. This
process is very similar to lethal injection-so much so that the same
8 7 Many of us likely
drugs are commonly used in both procedures."
know from personal experience that euthanizing a beloved pet,
although heartbreaking for the owner, is not intrinsically bad for the
animal.'8 8 Indeed, the euphemism "putting your pet to sleep" would
not be apt if the procedure caused the animal to suffer. The fact
that, each year, so many Americans freely decide to euthanize their
companion animals indicates that euthanasia is not an inherently
terrible ordeal. Our collective experience in this domain suggests
that the death penalty can be administered in a manner that does
not cause undue suffering.
The second medical procedure to consider is assisted death.' 89
Physician-assisted suicide is now available to residents of five states:
Oregon,' 90 Montana, 9 ' Washington, 192 Vermont, 193 and part of New
Feldenkirchen, Proposalfrom Oklahoma: Could Nitrogen Asphyxiation Replace Lethal
Injection?,SPIEGEL ONLINE (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
world/us-represe n tative-wants-to-replace-lethal-inj ection-with-nitrogen-a-991651 .html
(reporting that Oklahoma representative Mike Christian plans to introduce a bill
that will allow for the use of nitrogen gas as a method of execution).
187. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, AVMA GUIDELINES FOR THE EUTHANASIA OF
ANIMALS 29 (2013), https://www.avma.org/KB/Policies/Documents/euthanasia.pdf
(discussing the use of pentobarbital in combination with other agents).
188. See id. at 15-16 (discussing a variety of methods of animal euthanasia and concluding
that "[t]hese methods are inexpensive, humane, and painless if performed properly').
189. There are two legal types of assisted death: physician assisted suicide and
voluntary active euthanasia. For a comparison of the two methods, see Timothy E.
Quill et al., PalliativeOptions of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping Eating
and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active
Euthanasia,278J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2099, 2099-101 (1997).
190. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-897 (West 2015).
191. Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Mont. 2009) (plurality opinion)
(finding "no indication in Montana law that physician aid in dying provided to
terminally ill, mentally competent adult patients is against public policy").
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Mexico.194 Internationally, voluntary active euthanasia is legal in
Belgium, 9 5 the Netherlands," '6 and Luxembourg. 97 As a society, we
would not permit assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia if we
believed that the medications used in the procedure caused
significant suffering. Today, seventy percent of Americans support
euthanasia."9 ' Indeed, opponents of assisted death have advanced
many arguments against the practice, but not a single one claims that
assisted death should be banned because it causes the individual to
experience pain. 99 If we believe that euthanasia is a peacefil,
humane exit for our close relatives and pets, there is no reason to
believe that lethal injection is a painful event for criminals.
B.

CapitalPunishment is Not Instrumentally Bad

At first glance, the argument that the death penalty is instrumentally
bad for the prisoner because it leads to his death appears quite
strong."' It seems intuitive that snuffing someone out of existence is
bad for that person."z ' When you think more about it, however, this
192. Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.245.010,
.220 (West 2015).
193. Patient Choice at End of Life, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5283 (West 2015).
194. Morris v. Brandenberg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, slip op. at 12, 14 (2dJud.
Dist. N.M. Jan. 13, 2014) (holding that terminally ill patients who are mentally
competent have a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, and doctors could
not be prosecuted for providing such assistance).
195. The Belgian Act on Euthanasiaof May, 28th 2002, 9 ETHICAL PERSP. 182, 182 (Dale
Kidd & Herman Nys trans.). In 2014, Belgium extended the euthanasia law to children. See
Charlotte McDonald-Gibson, Belgium Extends EuthanasiaLaw to Kids, T[M (Feb. 13, 2014),
time.com/7565/belgium-euthanasia-law-children-assisted-suicide.
196. Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)Act Apr. 1,
2001, Stb. 2001 (Neth.), http://www.eutanasia.ws/documentos/Leyes/Internacional/
Holanda%20Ley%202002.pdf.
197. Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l'euthanasie et l'assistance au suicide [Law of March
16, 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHt DE
61
5, http://www.legilux.public.lu/
LUXEMBOURG [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF LUXEMBOURG], p.
leg/a/archives/2009/0046/a046.pdf#page=7.
198. Justin McCarthy, Seven in 10 Americans Back Euthanasia, GALLUP (June 18,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171704/seven-americans-back-euthanasia.aspx.
199. See generally THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO END-OFLIFE CARE (Kathleen M. Foley & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002) (providing a thorough
discussion of the arguments against assisted death).
200. Recall that an instrumental bad is something that ultimately leads to an
intrinsic bad. In this case, if being dead is intrinsically bad then the death penalty can
rightly be categorized as an instrumental bad.
201. My argument rests on the naturalistic assumption that death is the end of
our existence. This assumption is endorsed by the vast majority of philosophers. For
a comprehensive defense of this position, see KAGAN, supra note 154, at 209-10.
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argument fails to hold up quite so well. How exactly is ceasing to
exist bad for the executed person? After all, that individual won't be
around to experience his own nonexistence.
Two ancient Greek philosophers, Epicurus and his student
Lucretius, made this observation more than two millennia ago. From
that starting point, they developed three distinct arguments against
the badness of death.21 2 These arguments have proven so influential
that they are considered the most formidable challenge ever levied
against the badness of death. 2 3 They are still the subject of intense
discussion to this day.20 4
In this section, I will review Epicurus and Lucretius's three
arguments against the badness of death. Before proceeding, it is
important to note that Epicurus and Lucretius were concerned with
proving that death is not bad in any way. 205 I do not, however, rely
upon their arguments to reach that controversial conclusion.
Instead, I am only interested in defending the much more modest
and widely accepted view that death is not instrumentally bad. 20
1.

The perception problem
Epicurus presented two arguments against the badness of death.
They are both captured in the following excerpt from Epicurus's
Letter to Menoeceus.
Make yourself familiar with the belief that death is nothing to
us, since everything good or bad lies in sensation, and death

202. The theory that death is bad for the one who dies is commonly referred to as the
"harm thesis." See LuPER, supra note 154, at 60 ("[T] he harm thesis [holds that] death is, at
least sometimes, bad for those who die, and in this sense something that 'harms' them.").
203. See id. (calling Epicurus's and Lucretius's arguments the "best" challenge
to the harm thesis).
204. See, e.g., David Furley, Nothing to Us?, in THE NoRMs OF NATURE: STUDIES IN
HELLENISTIC ETHICS 75, 75 (Malcolm Schofield & Gisela Striker eds., 1986)
(evaluating the Epicurean notion that "death is nothing to us"); Phillip Mitsis,
Epicurus on Death and the Duration of Life, 4 PROC. Bos. AREA COLLOQUIUM ANCIENT
PHIL. 303, 303 (1988); Stephen E. Rosenbaum, How To Be Dead and Not Care: A
Defense of Epicurus, 23 AM. PHIL. Q. 217, 217 (1986) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, How To
Be Dead and Not Care] (defending Epicurus's view that "one's death is not bad for
one"); James Warren, Lucretius, Symmetry Arguments, and Fearing Death, 46 PHRONESIS
466, 466, 468 (2001) (examining Lucretius's symmetry argument).
205. For an argument that Epicurus only intended his arguments to prove death is
not intrinsically bad, see Kai Draper, Epicurus on the Value of Death, in THE METAPHYSICS
AND ETHICs OF DEATH: NEW ESSAYS 71, 71-79 (James Stacey Taylor ed., 2013).
206. See, e.g., Fred Feldman, Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death, 100 PHIL. REv. 205,
217-18 (1991) (acknowledging that "death is not intrinsically bad for anyone," but
criticizing Epicurus for failing to recognize that death can be comparatively bad).
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is to be deprived of sensation.... So that most fearful of all
bad things, death, is nothing to us, since when we are, death
is not present, and when death is present, then we are not.
So it is nothing to the living and nothing to the dead, since
with regard to the former, death is not, and as to the latter,
they themselves no longer are. °7
This passage challenges proponents of the badness of death to find
(1) a harm caused by death and (2) a time at which a subject is harmed
by death.0 8 If death, or any other event for that matter, does not
possess these two characteristics, then it cannot be bad for us. I will
look at each of these challenges in turn, starting with the
requirement that death must cause a harm.
By death, Epicurus does not mean the dying process.20 9 Indeed, if
the dying process is painful, it can be quite bad for the individual.
Julius Caesar, who was stabbed twenty-three times, undoubtedly died a
painful death."" His death, however, is quite distinct from the dying
process that led to it. Therefore, despite the terrible pain he felt while
alive, Caesar's death need not be painful for him in any way.
Likewise, when Epicurus issued the challenge to identify a harm,
he did not intend for us to point to harms incurred by third parties."'
Epicurus does not argue that a person's death is not bad for others
who go on living.212 Survivors may rightly feel sorrow that a person
they cared about has died. In this sense, death can very clearly be
bad. Epicurus's challenge, however, specifically requires us to find a
harm that affects the person who is dead. There is strong reason to
believe that such a harm cannot be found.

207. The translation of this passage is from Furley, supra note 204, at 75.
208. See LUPER, supra note 154, at 67 ("[J]f death harms the individual who dies,
there must be a subject who is harmed by death, a clear harm that is received, and a
time when that harm is received.").
209. See Rosenbaum, How To Be Dead and Not Care, supra note 204, at 218
(Epicurus's "conclusion is not about death or dying, but rather it is about being
dead. So it does not rule out a person's dying being bad for the person, as painful
experience makes obvious it should not."). For an argument that the death penalty
as a dying process is not painful, see supraPart II.A.
210. See GREG WOOLF, ET Tu, BRUTE?: THE MURDER OF CAESAR AND POLITICAL
ASSASSINATION 8-18 (2007) (discussing the assassination ofJulius Caesar).
211. See Rosenbaum, How To Be Dead and Not Care, supra note 204, at 218
(Epicurus's "conclusion does not entail that P's being dead is not bad for others or
that P's being dead is not bad in any way in which something might be bad but not
foranyone, if there is such a way. So, the argument, if sound, should not inhibit our
thinking that a person's being dead is bad in these other ways.").
212. See id.
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I will give a brief overview of Epicurus's argument. He begins by
assuming that death is the nonexistence of a person.21"3 Next,
Epicurus posits that only something that exists can perceive.2 14
Conversely, this means that something that does not exist cannot
perceive. This is a fairly intuitive premise. Try to think of an entity
that does not exist, yet can still perceive. Such an entity does not
seem possible. From these two premises, Epicurus shows that death is
the absence of perception.
Epicurus is not yet done. He needs one final premise to reach the
conclusion he desires. This last premise states that only things that are
perceived can cause harm. 215 Epicurus already established that people
who are dead cannot perceive anything. From this it follows that the
dead cannot be harmed. This leads to the grand conclusion: death
does not harm us. The complete argument is set forth in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Epicurus'sFirstArgument: What is Not Perceived Cannot Harm'
PI:

Death is nonexistence.

P2:

What does not exist cannot perceive.

Cl: (By P1 and P2)

Death is the absence of perception.

P3:

What is not perceived cannot harm us.

C2: (By C1 and P3)

Death cannot harm us.

6

There are two ways to challenge this argument. 217 The first is to
deny P1 by arguing that the soul survives death. If the soul does
continue on into an afterlife, then the rest of the argument obviously
falls apart. In this case, death would not be nonexistence; it would
instead be some kind of altered existence. Perhaps, as Plato believed,
our souls are immortal and contain our true essence. 211 If this
213.

See

id. at 217

(discussing

Epicurus's

finding

that

death

results

in

nonexistence, and is, therefore, harmless).
214. See id.
215. SeeJAMES WARREN, FACING DEATH: EPICURUS AND His CRITICS 23 (2004).
216. In the reconstruction of both Lucretius and Epicurus's arguments, I follow
the philosophical convention of using "P" to denote a premise and "C" to denote a
conclusion that follows from other premises. For example, "PI" will refer to the first

premise in the argument while "P2" will refer to the second premise.
217. This argument is adapted from WARREN, supra note 215, at 23.
218. SeeJames Warren, Socratic Suicide, 121 J. HELLENIC STUD. 91, 92 (discussing
the attributes of the Platonic soul).
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Platonic account is correct, then we will survive death and can be
219
harmed by posthumous events.
I set aside this possibility and instead endorse the naturalistic viewa theory that holds that the physical world is all that exists.122 The
naturalistic view is favored among philosophers, many of whom have
convincingly argued that people do not survive the death of their
bodies. 22 1 Even if their theories are wrong and the soul does survive
death, my argument could retain its validity. Denying P1 does not
prove death is harmful. It only shows that death might be harmful.
Under this conception of the immortal soul, death could, in fact, be
the most pleasurable state we ever experience. Indeed, Plato viewed
death as a more desirable state than life.222 f he is correct, it seems the
State is doing criminals a favor by executing them. Under this nonnaturalistic account, capital punishment would certainly fail to satisfy
the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement.
Given that we are concerned with inflicting punishment upon
criminals, we should be fairly confident that the punishment actually
is harmful. It would be an unjustly disproportionate punishment if
the death penalty sent the condemned to a state of infinite bliss. For
these reasons, among others, denying P1 is a nonstarter, and I do not
explore this possibility further.
There is, however, another way to argue against Epicurus. One
could deny P3. Given the naturalistic views endorsed by most
philosophers, it is not surprising that those who have sought to deny

For further discussion of this Platonic view, see id. at 92, 98.
For a discussion of metaphysical naturalism, see generally, RICHARD CARRIER, SENSE
AND GOODNESS WITHOUT GOD: A DEFENSE OF METAPHYSICAL NATURALISM 65-95 (2005).
221. See MICHAEL C. REA, THE WORLD WITHOUT DESIGN: THE ONTOLOGICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF NATURALISM 21 (2002) ("Most contemporary philosophers identify
themselves as naturalists, and much recent work in philosophy can be seen as part of
a general trend toward conducting philosophical inquiry under the umbrella of
naturalistic assumptions."); see also JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTHERS 79 (1984) (defining death as "the cessation of one's
existence, the first moment of a state of nonbeing, which is beyond harm or gain");
219.
220.

Barbara Baum Levenbook, Harming Someone After His Death, 94 ETHICS 407, 410

(1984) (defining death as "the first moment at which [a person] no longer exists").
See generally KAGAN, supra note 154, at 1-204 (mounting a comprehensive defense of

the view that death is one's nonexistence).
222. Plato believes "that the soul is immortal and that when released from the body it
can enjoy a better state of being." Warren, supra note 218, at 92. Christianity also reaches
a similar conclusion. See id. ("Both Platonism and Christianity hold out the promise of a
better existence after death (in heaven, amongst the Forms), and this makes it seem a
good idea not to spend any longer than necessary living a life here on Earth.").
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Epicurus's argument have generally focused on this premise. 2 - To
deny P3, one must show that not all harms must be perceived. In a
now classic paper, the philosopher Thomas Nagel presented several
2
thought experiments to argue that unperceived harms can occur.
215
Consider the following two scenarios adapted from Nagel's work:
(1) Sam enjoys his life, loves his work, and thinks he has a great
relationship with his wife. Unbeknownst to Sam, however, all
his coworkers dislike him and mock him behind his back.
Additionally, Sam's wife is cheating on him. Sam never
discovers any of this. Instead, he goes through life mistakenly
believing that he is loved and respected by all.
(2) Emily is a brilliant heart surgeon with a bright future. One
day, on the way home from work, she is in a terrible car
accident and suffers an injury that causes severe brain damage.
Emily loses all memory of her life before the accident and
reverts to an infantile state. Nowadays, she spends her days
engaged in the pursuit of communicating with asparagus
plants. Emily finds this activity fulfilling and is just as happy as
she was prior to the car crash.
Are Sam and Emily harmed? If we agree that they are-as Nagel
hopes we will-then we are forced to reject P3. Neither Sam nor
Emily ever becomes aware of the "bad" situation. Therefore, if they
were harmed, their perceptual experiences had nothing to do with
the harm. This would mean that there can be unperceived harms,
and P3 would be disproved.
Let's look closer at each of these examples. First, why might one
have the intuition that Sam is harmed? If his coworkers and wife
never deceived him, Sam's perceptual experiences would have been
exactly the same. To Sam, there is no discernible difference between
the world in which he lives and a world in which he actually is loved
and respected. Does one's intuition of harm have anything to do
with Sam's proximity to his betrayers and the likelihood that he will
eventually discover the deception? Nagel's critics believe that it does,
and they have offered another example to test whether a change in
proximity alters the intuition:
4-5 (1979).

223.

See, e.g.,

224.
225.

See id.
For Nagel's thought experiments, see id., which presents both accounts in fill.

THOMAS NAEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS
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Dave is a photographer in America. He loves his job and is renowned
for capturing beautiful images of desert landscapes. One day, a
woman in Italy sees a reprint of one of Dave's photographs. She hates
the picture and criticizes it in front of her friends. Her friends laugh
and agree that the photographer must be a talentless hack. Dave lives
the rest of his life blissfully unaware of this event.226
Unlike Sam, Dave appears not to be harmed. By all accounts,
however, Sam and Dave are in very similar situations; both are
ridiculed by others but never learn that they are the objects of scorn.
The only apparent difference is proximity. Whereas Dave is criticized
by people on a different continent, Sam is mocked by people he
interacts with on a daily basis. Sam is undoubtedly in a better
position to find out about the ridicule, but like Dave, he never does.
Perhaps one might think that this proximity affects Sam in other ways,
such as by preventing him from experiencing true love or sincere
friendships. This line of thought tries to explain the distinction by
holding that the betrayal's consequences harm Sam but the betrayal itself
does not However, if Sam is being harmed by the consequences, then he
has perceived some effects of the betrayal. In this thought experiment,
perception is still a necessary requirement of being harmed.22 7
Accordingly, the example fails to undermine Epicurus's premise.
Emily's case presents a more difficult challenge for P3.
Her
situation differs from Sam's in that she could never recognize that
she has been harmed. Whereas Sam could one day find out that his
wife and coworkers hate him, Emily is mentally incapable of
understanding that a car crash erased her memories and deprived
her of a burgeoning career as a heart surgeon.
Epicurus's best response is to argue that our intuitions are wrongEmily actually is not harmed by the accident.22 s All her needs are met,
and she is just as happy after the accident as she was before. In one
sense, this argument is surely correct. There is nothing inherently bad
about being in an infantile state. For instance, no one bemoans the

226. This thought experiment is adapted from John Donnelly, The Misfortunate
Dead: A Problemfor Materialism, in LANGUAGE, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH 153, 158-59
(John Donnelly ed., 1994).
227. Frederik Kaufman, Pre-Vital and Post-Mortem Non-Existence, 36 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 2
(1999) ("Even though the person does not experience the betrayal or deception,
evidently the fact that those things could be experienced makes all the difference.").
228. Other philosophers have argued that the person before the accident and the
person after the accident are actually two different people. This position derives
from a psychological account of personal identity. Because this defense cannot
explain slight variations of the Emily case, I do not explore it here. See, e.g., LUPER,
supra note 154, at 90 (discussing and criticizing this position).
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fact that a six-month old baby has the mental capacities of an infant.
We were all in that state at some point, and we never felt harmed by it.
For my purposes, this modest conclusion that Emily is not harmed in
this sense is sufficient. The Epicurean response does leave open the
possibility that Emily has incurred other sorts of harms. Most notably,
philosophers have claimed that Emily experiences comparative
harms. 29 That argument holds that Emily is harmed to the extent that
she is deprived of living her life as a successful heart surgeon. As I
stated at the outset of this section, however, I am only interested in
Epicurus's arguments insofar as they prove death is not an
instrumental harm. Therefore, I need not address the comparative
responses at this moment. This is not to suggest that the comparative
arguments say nothing insightful about the potential badness of the
death penalty. They very much do, and I will tackle them in a later
section. 23" But before doing so, I want to explore two additional
arguments against the instrumental badness of the death penalty.
2.

The timing puzzle
Epicurus offers another challenge to the badness of death. This
second account-known as the timing puzzle-provides a way around
the primary objection discussed above (i.e., that unperceived harms
do exist). In the timing puzzle, Epicurus grants that Sam and Emily
can be harmed even though they never perceive the harms. He then
attempts to get around this concession by arguing that their cases are
unlike death in one very important way: Sam and Emily still exist, but
a person who has died no longer does.
Epicurus writes, "[W]hen we are, death is not come, and, when
death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or
to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no
longer."2 '' Epicurus's intuition here is that something that does not
exist surely cannot be harmed. A more formal restatement of his
argument is in Table 2 below.
There are two premises and two ways of countering Epicurus's
argument. First, one could deny that death is nonexistence. For the
reasons discussed earlier,232 I do not explore this possibility.

229. Epicureans, however, would deny that there could ever be comparative
harms. See Draper, supra note 205, at 72-75.
230. See infra Part II.C.
231.

DIOGENES LAERTiUS, COMPLETE WORKS 123 (2015).

232.

See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
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Table 2: Epicurus's Second Argument: The Timing Problem
PI:

For an event (or state of affairs) to harm someone, that person
must exist at the time of the event (or state of affairs).

P2:

Death is nonexistence.

Cl:

Death cannot harm us.

2 33

The second way to refute Epicurus's argument is to show that a
person can be harmed by something that occurs when that person
does not exist. Restated with respect to death, the challenge here is
to identify a time at which death harms the person who has died.
There appear to be five possibilities.
(1)Death harms the person before he dies.
(2)Death harms the person at the moment he dies.
(3)Death harms the person after he has died.
(4) Death is eternally a harm for the person who dies.
(5)Death is a harm for the person who dies, but it is not a
harm at any specific time.
I will briefly consider each of these possibilities. First, it seems
rather odd to contend that death harms someone before that person
dies. To defend this position is to claim that effects can precede their

233. This formulation is adapted from WARREN, supra note 215, at 41.
See
Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, in GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHy AFTER ARISTOTLE 49,
50-52 (Jason L. Saunders ed., 1994) (translating Epicurus's original argument).
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causes. 234 If people possess free will, as the law assumes, this is an
impossible argument to make.235
There is one objection based on our real-world experiences that is
worthy of discussion. People who are alive do fear death. In fact, it is
quite common to experience anxiety when thinking about one's own
death. Granted, this anxiety is a harm; however, it is not the same
harm that we are interested in. The harm of anxiety does not flow
backwards from death itself. Instead, it flows forward from a person's
negative thoughts about her own death. In this case, the cause (bad
thoughts about death) actually does precede the effect.
Consider an example. Imagine a person (let's call herJen) who is
scheduled to have a very painful surgery. Jen knows the surgery will
be painful and spends weeks worrying about the suffering she will
endure. On the day of the surgery, the doctors discover thatJen does
not need the operation after all. Jen is relieved by this turn of events.
Nonetheless, she still suffered greatly the past few weeks. But what
caused her suffering? Surely, it could not have been the surgery-an
event that never occurred. It must have been her thoughts about the
surgery. Just as anticipation of the surgery (but not the surgery itself)
harmedJen, anticipation of death (but not death itself) can harm us.
2 36
The next possibility is that death can harm us after we die.
Setting aside comparative harms for the moment, this option seems

234. See LUPER, supra note 154, at 68 (defending a causal account of responsibility that
precludes backward causation). For a classic argument concerning the impossibility of
backward causation, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 121-26 (Ernest C.
Mossner ed., 1969). See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, HUME AND THE
PROBLEM OF CAUSATION 3 (1981) (discussing Hume's theories of causation). For a
discussion of backward causation, see Jan Faye, Backward Causation,STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (Feb. 16, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr20lO/entries/causationbackwards. See John Donnelly, The Misfartunate Dead: A Problem for Materialism, in
LANGUAGE, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH 153, 153-59 (John Donnelly ed., 2d ed. 1994)
(discussing this view). But see George Pitcher, The Misfortunes of the Dead, in THE
METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 157, 162 (John Martin Fischer ed., 1993) (arguing that death
harms us before it occurs because it thwarts our interests); FEINBERG, supra note 221, at
169-90 (discussing good samaritan statutes and questioning whether the
omission of an act can be the cause of a harm).
235. Julian Lamont, A Solution to the Puzzle of When Death Harms Its Victims, 76
AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 198, 202-05 (1998) (discussing whether death can be an
antemortem harm in either deterministic or non-deterministic worlds).
236. For defenses of this view, see, for example, Neil Feit, The Time of Death's
Misfortune, 36 NOfs 359, 369 (2002); Palle Yourgrau, Kripkes Moses, in THE METAPHYSICS
AND ETHICS OF DEATH:
NEw ESSAYS 134, 135-47 (James Stacey Taylor ed., 2013);
Levenbook, supra note 221, at 407, 410-15. But see LUPER, supra note 154, at 129-34
(criticizing this view and concluding that it "falls short of solving the timing puzzle").
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impossible." 7 After death, a person no longer exists and is therefore
not responsive to any events.23 s A dead person can no more benefit
from or be harmed by an event than a rock or shoe can. 23 9 The dead
simply lack this capacity.
The third possibility is that a person is harmed at the exact
moment of death. 2" Again, this response seems unsatisfying. Passing
from the state of being alive to the state of being dead is
instantaneous. Since one cannot both be dead and alive, this is
necessarily the case. Thus, any harm occurring at the moment of
death must also be instantaneous. The concept of an instantaneous
harm, however, does not make sense. Even the most fleeting pain
must last some amount of time. The fact that the instant of death is
without duration precludes the occurrence of any harm at this point.
So far, I have considered the time before death, the moment of
death, and the time after death, and each possibility seems lacking.
Maybe the problem is that we have been trying to identify a specific
time at which death causes harm. Perhaps that is a misguided exercise.
Several philosophers have used this as a starting point to develop
alternative theories that seek to explain when death harms us.
Fred Feldman is the foremost proponent of the Eternalaccount-a
position holding that death is bad for us at all times. He summarizes
this view in the following passage:
It seems clear to me that the answer to th[e] question [of when death
is bad] must be "eternally." For when we say that [] death is bad for
[the deceased], we are really expressing a complex fact about the
relative values of two possible worlds. If these worlds stand in a certain
value relation, then (given that they stand in this relation at any time)
they stand in that relation not only when [that person] exists, but at
times when [that person] doesn't. If there were a God, and it had

been thinking about which world to create, it would have seen prior to
creation that [death] would be bad for [the dead] .241
In this passage, Feldman argues that there is no definite time at
which death's harm begins or ends; instead, it is eternally harmful.
Feldman's proposal, unfortunately, does not generalize very well to

237. I take up the issue of comparative harms in the following section. See infra Part II.C.
238. See WARREN, supra note 215, at 47 ("[T]here is no person after death and
therefore no potential subject for harm.").
239. See Luper, supra note 159, § 4.3 (providing that a person cannot incur
harm after death).
240. See Lamont, supra note 235, at 209-12 (arguing that harm occurs at the
moment of death).
241. Feldman, supranote 206, at 221.
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other kinds of harms. Let's take a very basic, uncontroversial harm:
being punched in the stomach. For this incident, the harm occurs
when the puncher's fist connects with the punchee's stomach. The
pain will undoubtedly last for a while, but-assuming the puncher
was not Mike Tyson-the punchee will recover in time. Days later,
when the punchee looks back on the incident, he will likely agree
that he was harmed when the puncher's fist collided with his
stomach. This is a natural account that seems to line up with our
everyday experience of harms.
Feldman's view, however, provides a very different answer. It claims
that the punchee is eternally harmed by the event.24 2 The man who

was punched is just as harmed by the event when he was two years old
as he was at the moment the punch occurred and as he will be on his
eightieth birthday. This claim that all harms occur at all times is deeply
puzzling and unsatisfactory when applied to our common, everyday
experiences. 4 3 Perhaps Feldman's theory is only an account regarding
the badness of death and has nothing to say about more mundane
harms. If so, one must wonder why death is such an extraordinary case
that it alone requires a special theory of harm.
Discussions surrounding the fifth and final possible way in which
death may harm someone may provide an answer to this question.
This possibility maintains that death harms the person who died, but
the harm does not occur at any specific time. Thomas Nagel is the
most prominent supporter of this theory.
Nagel builds his argument from the observation that not all harms are
the same. Some are experiential, but others are purely relational.
Experiential harms are those that are bad in virtue of the sensations one
experiences.2 44 Relational harms, however, "are features of the relations
between a person, with spatial and temporal boundaries of the usual
sort, and circumstances which may not coincide with him either in space
or in time. "245 Death, Nagel argues, is one of these "irreducibly
relational" harms, and therefore, "the impossibility of locating it within
life should not trouble us. 2' 4 6 As opposed to Feldman's account, which

states that death harms us at all times, Nagel's account holds that death
harms us, but does so at no definite time. 47
242. See id. at 221 (noting that harm exists before, during, and after existence).
243. See Lamont, supra note 235, at 199-200 (discussing counterexamples that
weigh against Feldman's proposal).
244. See id. at 5.
245. Id. at 6.
246. Id. at 6-7.
247. See id. at 4.
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At first, Nagel's position is quite appealing. By splitting harms into
two distinct categories (experiential and relational), Nagel gets
around the problem illustrated in the punching example. Since
being punched in the stomach is an experiential harm, it occurs at a
specific time-namely the moment fist and stomach meet.
Despite solving this particular problem, Nagel's theory fails to provide
a sound explain for other common harms. For example, think back to
Emily's case and the issue of whether she was harmed by the car
accident. According to Nagel, Emily was harmed, but the harm was
purely relational. It is relational because Emily is not aware of the brain
damage she suffered, and she is just as content after the accident as
before. Therefore, under Nagel's view, Emily's harm occurred at no
definite time. This conclusion, however, is quite strange. If one accepts
that Emily was harmed, then it seems she was necessarily harmed at the
time of the accident.2" 8 After all, the accident was the direct cause of
Emily's condition. It is at odds with our everyday experience to hold
that the accident harmed Emily at no particular time.
After reviewing arguments for these five possible times at which
death can be a harm, I believe that none provide a satisfying response
to Epicurus's timing puzzle. Next, I rely on Lucretius's symmetry
argument to provide further support for the claim that the death
penalty is not instrumentally bad.
3.

The symmetry argument
Lucretius's symmetry argument is so named because it posits a
symmetry between past and future nonexistence. Lucretius summarizes
his argument in the following passage from De Rerum Natura:
Look back at the eternity that passed before we were born, and mark
how utterly it counts to us as nothing. This is a mirror that Nature holds
249
up to us, in which we may see the time that shall be after we are dead.
In this excerpt, Lucretius draws an analogy between the time
before we were born (pre-vital nonexistence) and the time after we
die (posthumous nonexistence). He maintains that both periods of
time are the same in all important respects. In a later passage,
Lucretius emphasizes the common intuition that there is nothing bad
about the fact that we did not exist before we were born. 25' From

248.

See Lamont, supra note 235, at 208-09 (exploring possible ways to save

Nagel's account and ultimately rejecting them).
249. LucRETIus, ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE 91

250.

See id.

(R. E. Latham trans., 1994).
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these two points, Lucretius argues that there is nothing bad about the
fact that we will not exist after we die.
This is a bold claim, but it is not yet the end of Lucretius's argument.
He is not content to prove just that death is not bad for us; he has the
more ambitious goal of showing that we should not fear death. To
complete this argument, Lucretius advances one more premise: it is
irrational to fear things that are not bad for us.25' If it is irrational to
fear things that are not bad for us, and death is not bad for us, then it
follows that it is irrational to fear death. 52' Table 3 presents a more
formal reconstruction of Lucretius's symmetry argument.
Table 3: Lucretius's Symmetry Argument
PI:

Our pre-vital nonexistence is not bad for us.

P2:

Our posthumous nonexistence is like our pre-vital
nonexistence in all relevant respects.

P3:

If two things are alike in all relevant respects, and one of them
is not bad for us, then the second is not bad for us, either.
Therefore, our posthumous nonexistence (i.e. death) is

CI: (By P1, P2, P3)

not bad for us.
P4:

If something is not bad for us, then it is irrational to fear it.

C2: (By C1and P4)

253
Therefore, the fear of death is irrational.

Many philosophers throughout history have found the symmetry
argument compelling. 254 Notably, in Tusculans, Cicero offered a
251. See id.
252. Importantly, Lucretius is not arguing that, because we do not presently fear prevital nonexistence, we should not presently fear posthumous nonexistence. Although
some philosophers have interpreted the argument in this manner, such a reading
misunderstands Lucretius's claim. See Stephen E. Rosenbaum, The Symmetry Argument:
Lucretius Against the Fear of Death, 50 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 353, 359 (1989)
[hereinafter Rosenbaum, The Symmetry Argument] (arguing "that Lucretius's symmetry
argument mayjustifiably be taken to be about present attitudes, not simply past and future
attitudes"). If Lucretius were making this argument, he would be committed to
defending the broader view that, because we no longer fear a particular event that
happened to us in the past (e.g., a tooth extraction), we also should not fear future
instances of that same event (e.g., a tooth extraction scheduled for tomorrow). This is a
belief Lucretius clearly did not hold. See LU'ER, supra note 154, at 61-62.
253. This presentation of Lucretius's symmetry argument is taken from LUPER,
supra note 154, at 61-62.
254. See Rosenbaum, The Symmetry Argument, supra note 252, at 354 (noting
that the symmetry argument "has appealed to very different thinkers throughout
Western history ... [including] Pseudo-Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch,
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similar view when he wrote, 'just as nothing was of concern to us
25 5
before birth, so too nothing will be of concern to us after death.
While discussing the foolishness of believing in an immortal soul,
Pliny the Elder also endorsed a version of the symmetry argument:
Everyone, from their last day will be in the same state as before
their first and there will be no more sensation of body or soul than
there was before birth. But how much easier and more sure for
everyone to believe in himself, taking as an example of the
tranquility to come what was undergone before birth?256
Seneca, likewise, adopted a variant of the argument:
Doesn't the person who wept because he had not been alive a
thousand years ago seem to you an utter fool? Equally foolish is
he who weeps because he will not be alive in a thousand years'
time. These two are the same: you will not be, nor were you.
Neither time belongs to you.

257

Insofar as it shows death is not instrumentally bad for the one who
dies, Lucretius's symmetry argument is very strong. Two of the
premises (P3 and P4) are unobjectionable and have never been the
subject of serious criticism. Therefore, if one is to deny Lucretius's
conclusion, it must be done by refuting either P1 or P2. 25' Despite
having the option, few scholars have taken the first path and argued
that our pre-vital nonexistence actually is bad for us. 59 Instead,
contemporary philosophers who attack the symmetry argument
generally do so by challenging P2. 6 °
Importantly, these
counterarguments only seek to disprove Lucretius's conclusion by
showing that death is comparatively bad. 261
Philosophers widely

Montaigne, Hume, and Schopenhauer").
255. WARREN, supra note 215, at69 (quoting and translating CcERO, TuScutANs§ 1.91).
256. Id. at 70 (quoting and translating PLNYTHE ELDER, NATuRAUSHSToRA § 7.188).
257. Id. (quoting and translating SENEcA, EPsruAEMoRALEsAD LucluM § 77.11).
258. See id. at 76-105 (discussing potential criticisms of the symmetry argument);
Kaufman, supra note 227, at 5 (coming to reject the symmetry argument, one "is thus
forced to think either that pre-vital nonexistence could be bad too, or defend an
asymmetry between the two periods of nonexistence that would legitimize our very
different attitudes toward them").
259. See WARREN, supra note 215, at 94-96 (noting Joseph Raz's argument that
being born later is also a deprivation of time spent alive, but that "no one thinks
being born later is a bad").
260. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 206, at 222-24.
261. Most philosophers who argue against Epicurus and Lucretius do so by
appealing to comparativsim. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 161, at 139 ("The evil of
death is a matter of deprivation; it is bad for a person when it deprives him or her of
intrinsic value; if he or she would have been better off if it had not happened.");
NAGEL, supra note 223, at 1 ("If death is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its

1426

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:1377

accept that the symmetry argument proves death is not
instrumentally bad. This single, uncontroversial point is the basis for
my reliance upon Lucretius's argument. Nonetheless, I will briefly
discuss some modern counterarguments because they lead into the
question of whether the death penalty is comparatively bad.
There are two main objections to P2. The first holds that our prevital nonexistence is substantively different than our posthumous
nonexistence because birth is a fixed point, but death is
indeterminate. In other words, it is impossible for someone to have
been born at an earlier time than the one at which he was actually
born, but it is possible for someone to have died at a later time.
Because of this asymmetry between birth and death, we can never be
deprived of pre-vital time, but we can be deprived of posthumous
time.
Thomas Nagel, the philosopher who developed this
counterargument, explains it in the following passage:
It is true that both the time before a man's birth and the time after
his death are times when he does not exist. But the time after his
death is time of which his death deprives him. It is time in which,
had he not died then, he would be alive.... But we cannot say that
the time prior to a man's birth is time in which he would have lived
had he been born not then but earlier. For aside from the brief
margin permitted by premature labor, he could not have been born
earlier: anyone born substantially earlier than he was would have
been someone else. Therefore the time prior to his birth is not time
in which his subsequent birth prevents him from living. His birth,
26 2
when it occurs, does not entail the loss to him of any life whatever.
Most philosophers who have considered Nagel's objection argue
that he is mistaken. 26" They maintain that it is possible for an
individual to have been born at an earlier time, and, therefore,
someone can be deprived of life by being born at a later time.2 4 It is
positive features, but only because of what it deprives us of."); Warren Quinn,
Abortion: Identity and Loss, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 24 (1984) (discussing comparative
harms in the context of abortion).
262. Thomas Nagel, Death, 4 NoOs 73, 79 (1970).
263. See Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer, Why Is Death Bad?, in THE
METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 219, 222 (John Martin Fischer ed., 1993) (arguing that
because both periods are experiential blanks, the prenatal nonexistence is a
deprivation like death); Feldman, supra note 206, at 221-25 (arguing that late birth is
just a great misfortune as premature death); Rosenbaum, The Symmetry Argument,
supra note 252, at 362-63 (concluding that "Nagel is incorrect in thinking that a
person might exist longer but could not logically exist earlier").
264. See Rosenbaum, The Symmetry Argument, supra note 252, at 360 ("The time
before a person's birth is a time of which his not having been born earlier deprives
him. It is a time in which, had he not been born as late as he was, he would be alive.
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not worth further exploring this argument because, in a later work,
However, the
Nagel himself came to agree with his critics.265
Lucretius by
refute
to
it
attempted
because
notable
is
argument
appealing to the comparative badness of death.
The second principle objection to Lucretius's symmetry argument
was developed by Derek Parfit. Parfit argues that we have an
evolutionarily ingrained temporal bias towards the future.2 66 This
bias causes us to view future pains with fear and past pains with
indifference. Therefore, even though pre-vital nonexistence and
posthumous nonexistence may be objectively symmetrical, they are
subjectively asymmetrical.167 To illustrate this claim, Parfit presents
the case of the hospital patient:
I am in some hospital, to have some kind of surgery.... [B]ecause
the operation is so painful, patients are now afterwards made to
forget it. Some drug removes their memories of the last few hours.
I have just woken up ....I ask my nurse if it has been decided when
my operation is to be ....She can tell me only that the following is
true. I may be the patient who had his operation yesterday. In that
case, my operation was the longest ever performed, lasting ten
hours. I may instead be the patient who is to have a short
operation later today. It is either true that I did suffer for ten
hours, or true that I shall suffer for one hour.
I ask the nurse to find out which is true. While she is away, it is
clear to me which I prefer to be true. If I learn that the first is true,
I shall be greatly relieved.2 6
If the patient's preference is correct, then it is clear that when
pleasure or pain takes place matters to us. Specifically, we prefer
pleasure to be in our future and pain to be in our past. Parfit
observes that the symmetry argument can only be correct if we are
temporally indifferent to pleasures and pains, and, since we are
temporally biased, Lucretius must be wrong.269 Parfit's intuition does

Therefore any delay in being born entails the loss of some life that its beneficiary
would have led had he been born earlier.").
265. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEw FROM NOWHERE 38-41 (1986) (equating a person's

essence with his brain, an object that conceptually could have existed at an earlier time).
266. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 175, 177 (1984).
267. Id. at 175 ("[W]e are biased towards the future. Because we have this bias,
the bare knowledge that we once suffered may not now disturb us. But our
equanimity does not show that our past suffering was not bad. The same could be
true of our past non-existence.").
268. Id. at 165-66.
269. Id. at 174-75.
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strike me as correct.2 71 The hospital case provides a compelling reason to
think that death can be a type of harm-specifically a comparative harm.
An important thing to emphasize, however, is that the example only shows
that death can be a comparative harm, not that it necessarily is one. In the

next section, I take up the question of whether capital punishment is
comparatively bad for the person who is executed.
C. CapitalPunishment is Not Comparatively Bad
An event that is comparatively bad is not bad simpliciter.27 ' Instead, it
is only bad in relation to another possible event.272 Recall the example
I discussed earlier that involved Amy and her choice of which law
school to attend. In the hypothetical, Amy selected Law School A, a
path that led to an enjoyable, if unremarkable, life. When this choice
is viewed alone, one cannot say whether attending Law School A was a
comparatively bad decision for Amy. To answer that question, one has
to determine what would have happened to Amy in the closest possible
273
world in which she did not attend Law School A.
In this scenario, the closest possible world is quite clear. Amy
would have attended Law School B, enjoyed a better life, and become
a high-profile government attorney. With this knowledge in hand, we
can conclude that attending Law School A was comparatively bad for
Amy. Even though she led a good life, she would have been better
off enrolling in Law School B, and for this reason, she was
comparatively harmed. Keep in mind that, for Amy, her decision was
not perceptibly bad or perceptibly deficient in any way. Nonetheless,
her decision was comparatively bad for her.
The philosopher Steven Luper offers a more formal definition,
writing that something is comparatively bad for us 'just when it does
or would harm us, and it harms us just when it makes our lives worse
2 74
than they would have been.
We can construct a simple formula to capture this definition. Let
CVE be the comparative value of event E's occurrence. This is the
value that we need to determine to figure out if an event is
comparatively good or comparatively bad. When CVE is positive, the
270. For an argument against Parfit, see Mitsis, supra note 204, at 303.
271. For a defense of the view that death is a comparative harm, see FELDMAN, supranote
161, at 138-42; LUPER, supranote 154, at 92-98 (discussing comparativism).
272. See LUPER, supra note 154, at 97-100 (using thought experiments to
illustrate comparative harm).
273.

For discussion of the closeness of possible worlds, see DAVID LEWIS, ON THE

PLURALITY OF WORLDS

274.

20-26 (2001).
154, at 7-8.

LUPER, supra note
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event is a comparative good, but when CVE is negative, the event is a
comparative bad. To calculate this, we need to identify the intrinsic
value of the world in which event E does occur and subtract from that
the intrinsic value of the closest possible world in which event E does
not occur. 275 The two intrinsic values can be represented as VE and
IVF, respectively. We know that IVE is equal to the benefits (BE)
minus the harms (HrE) in the world in which event E occurs.27 6
Likewise, IVE is equal to the benefits (B-E) minus the harms (H-E) in
the closest possible world in which event E does not occur.
From these facts, we can construct the formula below:
CV = (BE - H-) - (BE - H-E)
And that can be further simplified:
CVE = IVE - IVE

In sum, this equation shows that the comparative value of E equals
the difference between the intrinsic value of the world in which E
occurs and the intrinsic value of the closest possible world in which E
does not occur. If CVE is positive (i.e., IVE > IV-E), then E is
comparatively good for the subject. However, if CVE is negative (i.e.,
VE < !VE), then E is comparatively bad for the subject.
Ultimately, we are concerned with the death penalty. To evaluate
whether that punishment is a comparative harm for the person who is
executed, the formula requires us to determine two things: (1) the
intrinsic value of the world in which the death penalty (event E)
occurs and (2) the intrinsic value of the closest possible world in
which the death penalty does not occur. 27 7 The first number (lVE) is
very easy to pinpoint. Since death is one's nonexistence, there are no
intrinsic benefits or harms that can occur; therefore, we know that
IVr is zero. Plugging that into the formula yields the following result:
CVE = 0 - IVE
Subbing in zero makes it clear that everything hinges on IV L. If
IV-E is positive, the death penalty is a comparative bad, and if 1V-E is
negative, the death penalty is a comparative good. To calculate IV~E,
first we need to determine what would have happened in the closest
possible world in which the condemned individual was not sentenced
to death. Fortunately, this is a fairly easy matter. In the closest
possible world, the person would still have committed the same

275.

Id. at 98.

276. Id.
277. BEN BRADLEY, WELL-BEING AND DEATH 74 (2009) ("[D]eath is bad for the
person who dies at all and only those times when the person would have been living
well, or living a life worth living, had she not died when she did.").
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crimes and would still have been convicted by the same jury of his
peers. The only difference is that the criminal would have been
sentenced to life without parole instead of to death. With this in
mind, the final step is to evaluate whether, all things considered, a
life in prison yields more intrinsic benefits than intrinsic harms.
Some philosophers would argue that such a life, on the whole, is
necessarily a good life."7' They subscribe to the belief that death is
always comparatively bad for the one who dies and argue that life
itself is so valuable that harms can never outweigh the benefits of
experiencing the world.2 79 Thomas Nagel is a defender of that view:
[I]t is good simply to be alive, even if one is undergoing terrible
experiences. The situation is roughly this: here are elements
which, if added to one's experience, make life better; there are
other elements which, if added to one's experience, make life
worse. But what remains when these are set aside is not merely
neutral it is emphatically positive. Therefore life is worth living
even when the bad elements of experience are plentiful, and the
good ones too meager to outweigh the bad ones on their own. The
additional positive weight is supplied by experience itself, rather
than by any of its contents.' 8 °
There is a certain appeal to this idea that our sensory experiences
are intrinsically valuable. Indeed, life does seem inherently good.
However, Nagel goes too far.2 s ' Contrary to his expansive claim, some
lives just are not worth living. There are extreme scenarios to which
death is far preferable. For instance, if given the choice between going
to sleep and never waking up again or being waterboarded for ten
years straight after which time you will be fed to Bengali tigers, I
venture that nearly everyone would select the first option. People
would make this choice because being waterboarded and eaten by
tigers is comparatively bad relative to dying immediately and painlessly.
There is, of course, a very wide spectrum on which quality of life
can fall, and people will undoubtedly have differing opinions on the
precise point where a life superior to an immediate, painless death
lies. But, I will argue that life in prison rests on the comparatively

278. See Rosenbaum, Concepts of Value, supra note 162, at 149 (observing that some
philosophers subscribe to Aristotle's view that death is always worse than life).
279. NAGEL, supra note 223, at 2.
280. Id.
281. Most philosophers agree. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 227, at 1 ("Death
need not be a deprivation, however; hence death need not be an evil. The
deprivation account is not committed to thinking that death is necessarily an evil. It
all depends upon what would have happened had one not died when one did.").
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bad side. John Stuart Mill had it correct years ago when he
considered the issue:
What comparison can there really be, in point of severity, between
consigning a man to the short pang of a rapid death, and
immuring him in a living tomb, there to linger out what may be a
long life in the hardest and most monotonous toil, without any of
its alleviations or rewards-debarred from all pleasant sights and
sounds, and cut off from all earthly hope... ?282
1.

Life without parole means life without parole
There is a common misperception that life without parole
("LWOP") does not actually mean life without parole. The majority
of Americans believe that criminals who receive this sentence will, at
some point, be released. 2 3
This is consistent with Americans'
broader belief that most life sentences are of relatively short
duration. 284
As Georgia Supreme Court Judge Charles Weltner
stated, "Everybody believes that a person sentenced to life for murder
will be walking the streets in seven years. '2 5 Judge Weltner's
statement is an exaggeration, but only slightly so.
A survey of Indiana residents largely found that over one quarter of
them believed that people sentenced to life would be free within ten
years, and more than sixty percent placed that figure at fewer than
twenty years. 28 6 At the time of the survey, a criminal sentenced to life

282. John Stuart Mill, Speech In Favorof CapitalPunishment 1868, in PHILOSOPHICAL
272-73 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).

PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 271,

283. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 159 (1994) (discussing a survey
from the "University of South Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs, [which] showed
that only 7.1 percent of all jury-eligible adults who were questioned firmly believed
that an inmate sentenced to life imprisonment in South Carolina actually would be
required to spend the rest of his life in prison"); Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field,
Support for Death Penalty Still Very Strong. But IncreasingPreference for Life in Prison
Without Parole for Those Convicted of Capital Crimes, FIELD POLL 5 (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/Rls2393.pdf (finding that fortysix percent of Californians agree that life without parole "doesn't always guarantee
that the prisoner won't be released some day"); Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile
Lifers: Findings from a National Survey, THE SENT'G PROJECr 1 (Mar. 2012),
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj.The-Lives-of_.Juvenile-Lifers.pdf
("Sentences of life without parole are often erroneously believed to translate to a
handful of years in prison followed by inevitable release.").
284. Richard C. Dieter, Sentencingfor Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the
Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 116,
121 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
285. Id.
286. See Edmund F. McGarrell & Maria Sandys, The Misperception of Public Opinion
Toward Capital Punishment: Examining the Spuriousness Explanation of Death Penalty
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in Indiana would face up to sixty years in prison and would not
become parole eligible until after thirty years.2 87 A mere nine percent
of survey respondents correctly stated that the criminal would be in
prison for at least thirty years.288
The Supreme Court itself claims that LWOP is not as definite as its
name implies because the executive can always grant a pardon. 289) In
theory, the Court is right; clemency is possible. In practice, however,
it simply does not happen. 290 As one report observed, "[I]n the last
three decades[,] presidents and governors have virtually stopped
granting clemency. For those serving LWOP, clemency is the only
road out of prison-but it has been virtually shut down by the U.S.
presidents and state governors that govern its traffic."2' 9' In today's
climate, it is politically risky for presidents and governors to pardon
any criminals, much less those who have been convicted of violent
crimes and sentenced to life without parole. 92 This is reflected in the
Criminals
sheer infrequency with which clemency is granted.
sentenced to LWOP are in a hopeless situation. Between 1988 and
2010, only one federal inmate serving life was pardoned.2 ' As one
Support, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 500, 507 (1996) (finding that over twenty-five
percent of Indiana respondents believed that someone with a life sentence would
only serve ten years or less).
287. Id. at511 n.8.
288. Id.
289. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) ("[Tlhere remain the
possibilities of retroactive legislative reduction and executive clemency."); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A prisoner [serving
life] remains a member of the human family. ... His punishment is not
irrevocable."). But see Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69-70 (2010) ("[L]ife without
parole sentences share some characteristics with death sentences that are shared by
no other sentences" insofar as they "alter[] the offender's life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable ... except perhaps by executive clemency-the remote possibility of
which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.").
290. Molly M. Gill, Clemency for Lifers: The Only Road Out Is the Road Not Taken, 23
FED. SENT'GREP. 21, 21 (2010).
291. Id.
292. See id. at 23 ("For most governors, granting clemency to lifers-and
particularly to those serving [life without parole]-remains too risky, especially if the
person was violent or is a habitual offender."). When discussing life without parole,
politicians treat clemency as a non-option. See, e.g, Mario M. Cuomo, New York State
Shouldn'tKill People,N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/17/
opinion/new-york-state-shouldn-t-kill-people.html (discussing life without parole,
then New York Governor Mario Cuomo said there are "no 'minimums' or
'maximums.' No time off for good behavior. No chance of release by a parole
board, ever. Not even the possibility of clemency. It is,in practical effect, a sentence of
death in incarceration") (emphasis added).
293. See Gill, supra note 290, at 22. The prospects are no better for criminals
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prisoner lamented, "[M]y hope to someday be released is like hoping
2
to be one of the first people to live on Mars. 91
Due, in no small part, to politicians' need to appear tough on
crime, the number of prisoners serving LWOP has been growing
rapidly. In 1992, that statistic stood at twelve thousand.295 By 2003, it
had swelled to more than thirty-three thousand.296 In 2012, a mere
nine years later, nearly fifty thousand people were serving life without
parole. 297 This figure dwarfs the number of people who have been
executed since Gregg v. Georgia reinstated the death penalty. Between
1976 and 2015, just over fourteen hundred convicts have been put to
death 29 8-fewer
than three percent of the number of inmates
currently serving LWOP.
The reality is that life imprisonment laws are strictly enforced.211 If
the court sentences someone to LWOP, that person will never be
3
"
There is not a single example in the entire
released on parole..
United States in which that has happened. 0 ' Just like those fourteen

convicted under state law. Take California, for example. Since 1978, more than 2,500
criminals were sentenced to life without parole, and not even one had his sentence
commuted. See Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole,
America's Other Death Penalty, 88 PRISONJ. 328, 332 (2008).
294. Spoon Jackson, Dead Man Living, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL ENOUGH 115,
118 (Kenneth E. Hartman ed., 2013).
295. Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 27, 27 (2010).
296. Ashley Nellis & Ryan S. King, No Exit: The Expanding Use of Life Sentences in
America, THE SENT'G PROJECT 3 (July 2009), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/publications/incNoExitSept2009.pdf.
297. Tom Brown, Number of U.S. Prisoners in for Life Climbs to New High, REUTERS
(Sep. 18, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/us-usaprisons-sentencing-idUSBRE98HOYJ2O130918.
PENALTY
INFO.
Crx.,
by
Year
Since
1976,
DEATH
298. Executions
http://www.deathpenahyinfo.org/executions-year (last updatedJuly 14, 2015).
Adam Liptak, To Mre
299. This, however, was not always the case. See, e.g.,
Inmates, Life Term Means Dying Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2005), at 1 (observing
that "[j]ust a few decades ago, a life sentence was often a misnomer, a way to suggest
harsh punishment but deliver only 10 to 20 years").
300. This is a sobering fact for anyone who receives this punishment. As one prisoner
wrote, "What those of us serving life without the possibility of parole.., need to come to
terms with is it's notjust a term of art; it's an accurate, literal description of our sentence,
a sentence that doesn't contain within it even the possibility of parole." Kenneth E.
Hartman, The Five Stages of Lfe Without the Possibility ofParole, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL
ENOUGH 145, 147 (Kenneth E. Hartman ed., 2013).
301.
See The Truth About Life Without Parole: Condemned to Die in Prison, AM. C.L.
UNION
N. CAL.,
https://www.aclunc.org/article/truth-about-life-without-parolecondemned-die-prison ("No one sentenced to life without parole has ever been
released on parole, in California or in any other state."); see also ScoTT E. SUNDBY, A
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hundred individuals who were executed, each of the fifty thousand
people currently serving life without parole will die in prison.0 2
2.

Why life without parole is worse than death
If you were given the choice between life in prison with no possibility
of parole and the death penalty, which would you choose? Chances
are, you would unhesitatingly pick life without parole. But would you
ultimately regret this decision? Five years into your sentence, would
you see death as a welcome release from the daily torments of a
maximum-security prison? Ten years in, would you beg death to save
you from the mental anguish of another stay in solitary confinement?
Twenty years later, would you look back and realize that capital
punishment actually was the better, more humane option?
From an outsider's vantage point, it may seem hard to make an
informed decision. For most of us, prison is a foreign place. We
would not know what to expect if sentenced to spend one week there,
much less the remainder of our lives. There is perhaps only one way
to really understand the grim reality, and that is by looking at the
experiences of those who are serving life sentences.
The maximum-security prisons that house lifers. 3 are rather
harsh facilities. One LWOP inmate who has already served more
than thirty years behind bars wrote that these prisons "are bad in
(2005) ("Although
more than 2,500 inmates have been given sentences of life without parole since 1978
in California, no one has ever had a life sentence commuted to a lesser sentence.").
302. NELLIS, supra note 283, at I ("The reality is that a life without parole
sentence means that the individual will die in prison."). In theory, a prisoner could
have his life without parole ("LWOP") sentence commuted. See, e.g., Monique
Garcia, Debra Lynn Gindorf Case: Mom's Life Sentence Is Cut, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 2009),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-05-02/news/0905010363-1-postpartumdepression-post-release-mental-health (discussing the commutation of a life sentence
for a woman who killed her children while suffering from postpartum depression).
Commutation, however, is extremely rare. See Dieter, supra note 284, at 119. As
Edward Carnes, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, noted, "[L]ife without parole in Alabama means just that-no parole, no
commutation, no way out until the day you die, period." Id.; see also Peter
Applebome, Bill to Repeal Death Penalty in Connecticut Goes to Malloy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2012, at A21, A24 (quoting Governor Dannel P. Malloy of Connecticut who, upon
signing a bill that replaced the death penalty with LWOP said, "Going forward, we
will have a system that allows us to put these people away for life, in living conditions
none of us would want to experience. Let's throw away the key and have them spend
the rest of their natural lives in jail.").
303. The term "lifer" generally refers to those inmates who are serving life
sentences of any sort. In this Article, however, I use the term to denote only those
inmates who are serving life without parole.
LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: AJURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY 38

2015]

WHY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS No PUNISHMENT AT ALL

1435

ways the average citizen cannot really comprehend ....
Violence,
both from other prisoners and at the hands of guards, is rampant.
Sexual assault is commonplace, tolerated[] and built right into the
macho culture of prison. '"304
For many, the loneliness and isolation is overwhelming. 0 5 Prior
relationships fade away 0 6 Friends stop taking calls. Relatives stop
visiting. Those outside prison pretend you are dead, and those inside
are just waiting for it to be so. Despite being surrounded by others,
you are truly alone. As one lifer wrote,
Prison is coldness .... [N]o one in prison really cares about you,
not like those at home do. It's a chilling feeling to realize that no
one's life here would be significantly changed if I were to die
tomorrow. Loneliness breeds and thrives in the belly of the
monster known as prison. It strikes constantly and insidiously[,]
and it never goes away.3 7
As bad as this aspect is, many lifers have said that the worst part of
prison is the complete lack of freedom. 0 8 An inmate who has already
served fifteen years summed it up as follows: "There's no more doing
what you want, no waking up in your own bed at home. There's no
anything, just four walls staring back at you and a stranger sleeping
either below you or above. Your existence is as a number, a bed
space." 3" And frequent lockdowns ensure that prisoners get to know

304. Kenneth E. Hartman, Too Cruel a Fate, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL ENOUGH
63, 71 (Kenneth E. Hartman ed., 2013).
305. AM. C.L. UNION, UNITED STATES' COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONVEINTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT

67 (2014),

https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-cat-shadow-reportL2014_v2.pdf
("In interviews
with the ACLU, prisoners reported feelings of unremitting hopelessness, loneliness, anxiety,
depression, fear, isolation from family and their community, and suicidal thoughts.").
306. See Joseph Dole, The Meaning of Life, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL
ENOUGH 119, 123 (Kenneth E. Hartman ed., 2013) (describing LWOP as "[a] life
spent watching as your family and friends slowly drift away from you, leaving you
in a vacuum, devoid of any enduring relationships").
307. Diane Hamill Metzger, Life in a Microwave, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: INSIDE
VIEWS 138, 139 (RobertJohnson & Hans Toch eds., 2000); seeJohnson & McGunigallSmith, supra note 293, at 338 (quoting one lifer as saying that the worst part is
knowing you will never again experience love. "Nobody to grab hold of me and hug
me. I mean real love. I'll never feel that emotion again.").
308. See Ernest Patrick, Meaning of 'Life' in Prison, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT:
INSIDE VIEWS 141, 141 (RobertJohnson & Hans Toch eds., 2000) ("For the prisoners,
the loss of freedom is devastating. Everything they have taken for granted is gone.
They have no control over their lives, no choices."); Johnson & McGunigall-Smith,
supra note 293, at 338 ("The thing I miss most.., is the right to choose. I no longer
have any choice-when I shower, where I go, what I do.").
309. Charlie Praphatananda, Just a Matter of Time, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL
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their bed spaces very well.31 For many of the inmates, such as those
housed in solitary confinement for prolonged periods of time, even
3
this picture is too rosy. '
One lifer, William Blake, who has been in solitary confinement for
more than twenty-five straight years described his experience as a
[twenty-three]-hour a day lockdown in a cell smaller than some
closets I've seen, with one hour allotted to "recreation" consisting
of placement in a concrete enclosed yard by oneself or, in some
prisons, a cage made of steel bars. There is nothing in a [solitary
housing unit] yard but air: no TV, no balls to bounce, no games to
12
play, no other inmates, nothing.'
Blake's sentence ensures he will die in prison and his indefinite
detention in solitary confinement ensures he will experience the most
agonizing, protracted death the State can constitutionally impose. Given
this, it should not be surprising that Blake wishes he were dead already:
What nobody knew or suspected back then, not even I, [was that]
on [the] very day [I was sentenced,] I would begin suffering a
punishment that I am convinced beyond all doubt is far worse than
any death sentence could possibly have been.... Though it is true
that I've never died and so [I] don't know exactly what the
experience would entail, for the life of me I cannot fathom how
dying any death could be harder or more terrible than living
through all that I have been forced to endure....
Had I known in 1987 that I would spend the next quarter-century in
solitary confinement, I would have certainly killed myself. If I took a
month to die and spent every minute of it in severe pain, it seems to
me that on a balance that fate would still be far easier to endure than
the last twenty-five years have been. If I try to imagine what kind of

131, 133 (Kenneth E. Hartman ed., 2013).
310. See Hartman, supra note 304, at 71 ("Prisoners spend most of their time
under some form of lockdown, which translates into no out-of-cell time for weeks to
months save the occasional shower. Food is atrocious, recreation is sparse to
nonexistent, and opportunities to participate in meaningful programs are rare, at
best."); Jessica Pishko, The End to Race-Based Lockdowns in California Prisons, PAC.
STANDARD (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.psmag.com/politics-and-law/end-race-basedlockdowns-california-prisons-94497 (writing that some lockdowns have lasted more
than one thousand days).
311. See, e.g., Robert King, Experience: I Spent 29 Years in Solitary Confinement,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2010, 7:02 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/
2010/aug/28/29-years-solitary-confinement-robert-king (describing the conditions
of his twenty-nine-year stay in solitary confinement).
312. William Blake, Voices from Solitary: A Sentence Worse Than Death, SOLITARY
WATCH (Mar. 11, 2013), http://solitarywatch.com/2013/03/11/voices-from-solitarya-sentence-worse-than-death.
ENOUGH
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death, even a slow one, would be worse than twenty-five years in the
box-and I have tried to imagine it-I can come up with nothing.
Set me afire, pummel and bludgeon me, cut me to bits, stab me,
shoot me, do what you will in the worst of ways, but none of it could
come close to making me feel things as cumulatively horrifying as
what I've experienced through my years in solitary....
Solitary
confinement for the length of time that I have endured it, even apart
from the inhuman conditions that I have too often been made to
endure it in, is torture of a terrible kind; and anyone who doesn't
think so surely knows not what to think. 13
Even for criminals who never set foot in solitary, prison life is not
much better. Knowing you will never again be free from the prison
walls is intensely dehumanizing. It induces a hopelessness so profound
that those of us on the outside can scarcely even imagine it.31' As one
lifer poetically put it, each morning starts "a fresh day of utter despair,
lived over and over for an entire lifetime," 315 As another wrote, "I
awaken with a feeling of dread. A day in prison offers nothing to look
forward to. It is an existence of endless repetition, restriction, and
regimentation.... Prison is sameness, day after day, week after week,
year after year. It is total confinement of body and spirit and total
separation from everything real and important." 316 How could they not
feel this way? Every moment, they are forced to grapple with the
3 17
pointlessness of their continued existence:
[A]s hard as it is for man to come to terms with meaninglessness and
infinity, it is impossible to adjust to infinite meaninglessness. I can think
of no better way to describe the intent of a life without parole sentence.
It is an exile from meaning and purpose, and from hope. Inevitably, as

313. Id.
314. WILLIAM TALLACK, PENOLOGICAL AND PREVENTIVE PRINCIPLES 151 (1889) ("The
criminal who is sentenced for a very long, but definite, term of incarceration, even if
for fifteen or twenty years, has at least a powerfully alleviating influence in the
prospect afforded by the hope of ultimate restoration to the friendships and
pleasures of free life. Whereas perpetual imprisonment is accompanied by the
darkness of despair .... ").
315. Dole, supranote 306, at 124.
316. Metzger, supra note 307, at 138, 140; seeJoseph A. Badagliacca, Too Cruel, Not
Unusual Enough, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL ENOUGH 57, 61 (Kenneth E. Hartman
ed., 2013) ("It's all just a relentless cycle, like that movie 'Groundhog Day' where Bill
Murray's character wakes up to the same day over and over and over.").
317. Dole, supra note 306, at 123 ("Life without the possibility of parole means
constant contemplation of a wasted life, and continual despair as to your inability to
accomplish anything significant with your remaining years.").
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the years roll by, bitterness begins to overtake even the strongest of men,
fueled by this banishing from all that is human.318

The State does nothing to mitigate this meaninglessness. Although
many prisoners have the ability to enroll in courses for college credit
or to pursue other rehabilitative activities, most lifers do not have this
option.3 1 '

As the Supreme Court noted, "[D]efendants

serving

[LWOP] sentences are often denied access to vocational training and
32
other rehabilitative services that are available to other inmates.
Even when lifers are not categorically denied access to these services,
they are often put at the bottom of the list--only given a chance to
partake if there is sufficient funding to give everyone else an
opportunity first.32 ' Frequently, that chance never comes.
All of this, combined with indefinite detention, instills in prisoners
a sense of helplessness and hopelessness that, in many, causes severe
depression, chronic anxiety, despair, and suicidal fantasies. 2 2 Lifers
are driven to madness. 23 For these reasons, it is not surprising that
lifers view their punishment as a slow, torturous death sentence that
is far worse than the traditional death penalty. 324 As one lifer
318. Kenneth E. Hartman, The Other Death Penalty, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL
ENOUGH 173, 177 (Kenneth E. Hartman ed., 2013).
319. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIvES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 67-72 (2005), www.amnestytisa.org/
sites/default/files/pdfs/therestoftheirlives.pdf.
320. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (citing Brief of the Sentencing
Project as Amicus Curiae Petitioners at 11-13, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)
(Nos. 08-7412 & 08-7621)).
321.
See AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 319, at 68-71; Robin
Ledbetter, Laying Roots, in TOO CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL ENOUGH 13, 20-21 (Kenneth E.
Hartman ed., 2013) ("Because of the length of my sentence, I'm not permitted to
take college classes. I am blocked from partaking in other programs because of my
sentence. I am only good now for scrubbing down the institution and maintaining
its polished floors. I am only good now to shovel out slop in the chow hall and empty
the trash. They want me to sweep, mop, and window wash this jail for at least the
next thirty-eight years, and I am supposed to choose life over death?").
322. See, e.g., Ian Robbins et al., Psychiatric Problems of Detainees Under the AntiTerrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, 29 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 407, 408 (2005)
(helplessness and hopelessness are "integral factor[s] in indefinite detention"); AM.
C.L. UNION, supra note 305, at 68 ("[A] higher percentage of LWOP prisoners
suffer[] from mental illness-primarily serious depression-than parole-eligible
prisoners with a life sentence.").
323. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 325, 354 (2006) (summarizing the damaging effects of solitary confinement on
one's mental stability).
324. Correctional officers who have observed the horrible conditions of LWOP echo
this sentiment. SeeJohnson & McGunigall-Smith, supra note 293, at 340 (quoting one
correctional officer as saying, "I think [LWOP is] harder to face than the death penalty in
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reported, the experience is "akin to being dead, without the one
benefit of not having to suffer any more." '25 Another added that it
326
really is "a painstakingly slow death row.
Lest one think that a few improvements to the prison system could
make LWOP more palatable than death, we need only look at William
Tallack's research on Swedish prisons in the late 1800s. 327 As he wrote,
It would perhaps be impossible to find any prisons conducted with
more mildness and mercy, than those of Sweden ....
[Nevertheless,] convicts whose original sentences of death had
been commuted to life-imprisonment, who had already suffered
upwards of twenty years' incarceration, and whose applications for
liberation had repeatedly been refused [asked,] "Why did you
spare us from the infliction of death, only to keep us here in
association with the vilest criminals? You have buried us alive. The
King's clemency to us is no real mercy. On the contrary, it is the
severest aggravation of our punishment, to compel us to drag out
'
our lives, without a ray of the hope of mercy."328
This preference for death is neither idle speculation nor a fleeting
desire held only during a prisoner's darkest moment. For many
death-row inmates, the choice between life and death is very real.
When a condemned's mandatory appeals are exhausted, he must
decide whether to give up and accept execution or to mount a series
of optional appeals that, in a best case scenario, would convert his
sentence to life without parole." 1' Those who are confronted with
this choice frequently opt for death. 330 They do so because they view
life without parole as a far worse fate. 31 To them, death "seems way
the sense that they know they are going to live the rest of their life in this kind of an
environment. They are not going to get out and be able to be with their families and
loved ones again. I think that's a little harder-they just go on day after day wondering
when they are going to die. It's a sorry situation to be in for that long.").
325. AM. C.L. UNION, supranote 305, at 68.
326. Patricia Prewitt, Slow Death Row, in Too CRUEL, NOT UNUsUAL ENOUGH 29, 31
(Kenneth E.Hartman ed., 2013).
327. TALLAcK, supra note 314, at 154-55.
328. Id.
329. Bryan Robinson, Death-Row Inmates Prefer Death to Life, ABC NEWS (Jan. 7,
2003), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90935&page=3 (pointing out that, for
more and more death row inmates, there is no real hope of ever exiting prison).
330. Execution of "Volunteers" Raises Questions About the Purpose of Death Penalty,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-volunteersraises-questions-about-purpose-death-penalty ("About [twelve percent] of those who
have been executed since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 have voluntarily
waived appeals that would likely have delayed their execution.").
331. Id. ("For many of these inmates, the prospect of remaining in prison for life
is worse than the death penalty."); see Robinson, supra note 329 (discussing the
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'
more real and promising than living a[] LWOP sentence." 32
Simply
33
3
put, execution provides "an escape from punishment"
-an escape
from the torment that is life without parole. As Joseph Badagliacca, a
lifer who is on his seventeenth year in prison, wrote:
There are many times when I genuinely envy those to whom the
court just flat out said, "We are going to kill you." Those guys, at
least, have a shorter wait for the inevitable; a set date to die. I
wonder if they look at my Deathbed and say, "Thank God the court
didn't do that to me," or maybe not. To each his own cross to bear,
they say. But at least the tubes used on those guys kill them as
quickly and humanely as killing someone can be. I thought any
death penalty was not allowed to be torture. I see I was wrong.3
Unfortunately, for the thousands sentenced to LWOP, execution is
not an option. Instead, a lifer's tortured existence only comes to an
end when he dies a natural death.
Let us go back to the equation that motivated this whole discussion
of life without parole:
VE. = -/VE. Recall that the goal was to
determine an appropriate valuation for 1V-E (the intrinsic value of a
life spent serving LWOP). The inmates enduring this sentence have
given us good reason to think that IV L must be negative. These
prisoners have painted a picture so dire that a positive valuation seems
quite unlikely. The lifers themselves state that death is far preferable to
their current existence. 35 If we believe their assessment is accurate, then
the comparative value of the death penalty (CV) must be positive.
From this, it follows that capital punishment, as practiced in the United
States, is not comparatively bad for the person who is executed.

increasing frequency with which death-row inmates opt for death).
332. Jackson, supra note 294, at 118.
333. Robinson, supra note 329. After years on death row, many prisoners
optimistically await execution. As one such inmate reports,
I'm looking forward to this. The situation I'm in now is horrible. To me, I
can't think of anything worse than this ...to me, in my situation that I am in
right now, this is the worst it could possibly be so it's a relief to know that I'm
not going to be here no more ...the next journey has got to be better than
this one.
Johnson & McGunigall-Smith, supra note 293, at 334. Even victims have expressed a
belief that death is the easy way out. As one survivor of Timothy Mcveigh's
Oklahoma City bombing said, "[D]eath by injection is 'too good' for McVeigh .... I
know it sounds uncivilized, but I want him to experience just a little of the pain and
torture that he has put us through." AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THEAMERICAN CONDITION 64 (2001).

334.
335.

Badagliacca, supra note 316, at 61-62.
See id.; see also TALLACK, supra note 314, at 154-55; Jackson, supra note 294, at

118; Johnson & McGunigall-Smith, supra note 293, at 334; Robinson, supra note 329.
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In the previous three sections, I have shown that capital punishment
is not bad in any identifiable way for the condemned. This line of
argument indicates that capital punishment is not actually a
punishment within the Supreme Court's understanding of the term.
Moreover, because capital punishment is imposed only for the most
severe crimes, it is clearly not, in any reasonable sense, a punishment
that fits the crime. Accordingly, its continued use is a clear violation of
the Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has provided two justifications for the death
penalty: deterrence and retribution. In this Article, I have argued
that neither rationale can withstand scrutiny.
The empirical
literature conclusively demonstrates that capital punishment does not
deter crime. The philosophical literature convincingly illustrates that
the death penalty, as practiced in the United States, does not qualify
as a retributive punishment. This conclusion follows because the
Supreme Court's theory of retribution requires punishments to be
bad, in some way, for the one who is punished; but the death penalty
is not bad, in any way, for the one who dies. Specifically, the death
penalty is neither intrinsically bad, nor instrumentally bad, nor
comparatively bad. Simply put, capital punishment is no punishment
at all, and therefore, its current use is a violation of the
proportionality requirement embedded in the Eighth Amendment.

